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Symbiosis: The intimate living together of two dissimilar organisms
in a mutually beneficial relationship.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and legal academics are waging a fierce war over the soul
of legal education in the United States.' The various battles in this war
include disputes over the proper emphasis on teaching versus scholar-
ship; the need for clinical, practical, or transaction-oriented education
versus the need for theoretical education; and the need for traditional
doctrinal work versus the need for interdisciplinary or more liberal arts-
oriented education within law schools. 3 The war also plays itself out in
discussions over law school hiring and tenure decisions.'
1. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993).
2. This article only focuses on the debate over legal education in the United States.
Nonetheless, because it is hard to imagine a system of legal education in which a debate over the
proper role of theory and practice does not exist in some form, the ideas expressed in this article
may be relevant in other countries as well. See infra note 59.
3. The large number of reports, law review articles, conferences, and symposia recently
devoted to issues of legal education illustrates the deep concern over these issues. See, e.g.,
Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 145 F.R.D.
149, 201 (1992) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Conference); A Symposium on Legal Scholarship, 63 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 521 (1992); Colloquium on Legal Scholarship, 13 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1988); Harry
T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational
Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO B. [hereinafter MacCrate Report];
Bayless Manning et al., The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Legal Education for a
Changing Legal Profession, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 657 (1988); Papers from the Yale Law Journal
Symposium on Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981) [hereinafter
Yale Symposium]; Symposium, Civic and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525 (1993);
Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993); Symposium, Legal Scholarship, 39
J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1989); Symposium, The Growth of Large Law Firms and Its Effect on the
Legal Profession and Legal Education, 64 IND. L.J. 423 (1989); Symposium, The Justice Mission
of American Law Schools, 40 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 277 (1992).
4. Those schools that are placing an increasingly heavy emphasis on theory, and particularly
interdisciplinary theory, are often reluctant to hire as professors persons with more than just a few
years in practice. Instead, they often prefer to hire a person with a Ph.D. in social science or
another discipline in addition to a J.D. See, e.g., D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 220
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The "war" over legal education does not necessarily pit academics
against practitioners. Rather, not only practitioners 5 and judges, 6 but
also many legal academics are questioning the purpose and value of law
school teaching in general and legal academic scholarship in particular.7
Proclaiming a widening gap between legal practice and legal education,
many critics of existing legal education mostly focus their attacks on
what they see as the increasingly theoretical and interdisciplinary
aspects of legal education.
While the critics' views are diverse in content and degree two prin-
cipal claims emerge: that law schools are failing to teach students how
to practice law and that professors are wasting vast amounts of time
writing highly theoretical articles, read only by other academics, that
focus on "anything but law."9 Practitioners and their allies often reserve
their harshest criticisms for the anti-black letter critical legal studies
movement, and for the recent growth in so-called "meta" theory" ° and
(Judge Harry Edwards expresses concern over the "trend to hire law teachers who have little or no
practical experience, and who have little or no interest in doctrinal analysis .... [and the] trend to
hire 'law and' types and 'impractical' scholars who are disdainful of legal practice."); see also
MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 223 (1994) ("Persons whose main interests are
in fields other than law now wield considerable influence on the hiring and promotions process,
especially at elite schools.").
5. E.g., Talbot D'Alemberte, Law School in the Nineties, 76 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1990) (stating
as ABA president-elect: "We are very much a divided profession. Our academic side is over here
and the practicing lawyer is over there, and they don't connect very often."); MacCrate Report,
supra note 3, at 240 (ABA task force's conclusion that law schools do not teach full range of
needed legal skills).
6. See generally Edwards, supra note 3 (federal judge's critique of legal education as
insufficiently practical and doctrinal).
7. E.g., D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 215 (comments of Emma Jordan, president
of the Association of American Law Schools and Professor of Law at Georgetown, noting that
some elite law schools exhibit an inappropriate scorn for legal practice); Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law
Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1236-39 (1991) (law professor's charge that law schools err in
seeing themselves as postgraduate academic centers rather than as trainers for future
practitioners); Harry H. Wellington, Charles Evans Hughes Lecture to the New York County
Lawyers Association (Apr. 8, 1993) (on file with author) (former Dean of Yale Law School noting
and criticizing the gap between legal education and legal practice).
8. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 42-57; Johnson, supra note 7, at 1236-39; and see
infra text accompanying notes 145-154.
9. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 1238-39 (criticizing phenomenon of law schools that
teach ABL-"anything but law"). But see Francis A. Allen, The Dolphin and the Peasant: Ill-
Tempered, but Brief Comments on Legal Scholarship, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION
183, 184-85 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988) (asserting with praise that
academically elite law schools have become dominated by persons primarily interested in
disciplines other than law).
10. "Meta" theory has been defined as theory about theory. Sanford Levinson, The Audience
for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or, Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U.
CoLo. L. Rv. 389, 396-402 (1992). Professor Levinson explains that where a traditional
constitutional theorist proposes his or her own theory as a means of decoding the true meaning of
the Constitution, a meta-theorist views the Constitution as an "arena" or "inkblot" in which
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"law and" scholarship. Those disciplines include law and economics,
feminist and critical race theory, law and society analysis, and the law
and literature movement.'"
Academia's responses to these criticisms have been varied. Many
professors praise the disjuncture between legal practice and legal the-
ory. 2 Such theory advocates proudly proclaim that law schools are not
mere trade schools, and that cutting edge meta-theoretical scholarship is
important in reconceptualizing our legal system. These theorists charge
law schools with the duty to address problems raised in such disciplines
as economics, sociology, psychology, philosophy, theology, literature,
and history, and to teach future lawyers and civic leaders how to think
critically about law and our legal system.' 3 Such theoreticians contend
it would waste law school faculty as a resource to spend too much, or
perhaps even any, time teaching students the "nuts and bolts" of how to
practice law. They argue that such training is best provided by future
employers out in the real world.' 4
different theories compete, without a single theory emerging as the correct theory. Id. at 396-97,
399.
11. While these various "law and" theories often represent vastly different ideological
approaches, they nonetheless share the goal of providing descriptions and system critiques of our
current legal system and theories based on methodologies and principles drawn from other fields.
See generally Philip C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
251, 296-97 (discussing growth of legal analysis from various perspectives such as sociology,
economics, philosophy, legislative policy, and literature). A new legal journal called Law &:
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal was established by the University of Southern
California in 1992 not for publishing traditional legal scholarship but rather to seek articles based
on "perspectives of disciplines upon which the law is premised." Foreword to 1 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. i, iv (1992).
12. As Owen Fiss put it: "Law professors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law
and to teach their students what they happen to discover." Letter from Owen M. Fiss to Paul D.
Carrington, in Peter W. Martin et al., Of "Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic
Freedom, 35 J. Legal Educ. 1, 26 (1985). See also J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom and
Political Neutrality in Law Schools: An Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional
Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 328-29 (1993) ("Teaching law school would be unbearably
puerile without the intellectual challenge and gravity of scholarship."); George L. Priest, Social
Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437,439
(1983) (favorably recognizing the gap between theory and practice).
13. See Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L.
REv. 637, 638, 656-57 (1968) (discussing the modern law professor's schizophrenic attempt to be
both a "Hessian" trainer of lawyers for practice and a true academic, and concluding that the two
roles should be separated into an LL.B. track, actually aimed at preparing lawyers for practice, and
a Ph.D. program, aimed at those who wish to become legal academics or high level policy
makers).
14. Not surprisingly, adherents to this view believe law schools should hire as professors
persons with solid academic credentials, as opposed to practical experience. In fact, such
theoreticians may often view more than a few years of practice negatively, even where the
practitioner has a strong academic background, believing that the immersion in practice will have
tainted the individual's academic abilities. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 1243 (law schools see
themselves as geared to study society, not legal doctrine); Robert Stevens, American Legal
[Vol. 50:707
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Critics and defenders of current legal education clearly have very
different views as to the appropriate purpose and means of legal educa-
tion and scholarship. Furthermore, the views differ quite sharply even
among the critics and among the defenders. However, one belief is
implicitly (if not explicitly) expressed by virtually all attackers and
defenders: highly theoretical "law and" theories have no direct rele-
vance to practicing attorneys. Critics of current legal education often
target such theories as among the prime villains, charging them with
causing the failure of classroom education and the irrelevance of schol-
arship.15 Nonetheless, even defenders of the current system do not, by
and large, praise such abstract theories for assisting private attorneys in
daily private practice. Instead, the defenders claim that such theories are
admirable for other reasons, such as training people how to think or
critique the current system. Some might add that such abstract theories
may aid judges or legislators in reaching better decisions or crafting bet-
ter legislation.' 6 While defenders of theory frequently contend that the
most theoretical work has practical value,17 they usually fail adequately
to support their broad assertion by showing how theoretical work is use-
ful to practitioners.18 More important, such defenders fail to accept the
Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellectual Conceptualism, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442, 446
(1983) (doctrinal practitioner-oriented work is not valued in academia). For a general discussion
of the theoreticians' views see infra text accompanying notes 160-181.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 108-159.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 162-181. Curiously, academics seem more interested
in training public practitioners (judges and legislators) than in training private practitioners. Yet,
most legal academics do not attempt to make their theories readily accessible or understandable-
even to judges and legislators.
17. Catharine MacKinnon is an academic who staunchly defends theory for its practical
value. She states: "It is common to say that something is good in theory but not in practice. I
always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is it?" Catharine A. MacKinnon, From
Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 180-181. There are of course some exceptions. A
number of feminist theorists have recently written books and articles focusing explicitly on the
connection between theory and practice. See, e.g., RuTH COLKER, PREGNANT MEN: PRAC'iCE,
THEORY, AND THE LAW (1994); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences:
The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 25-26 (1990) (calling for
scholarship that would connect "grand theory" and "personal narratives"); Phyllis Goldfarb, A
Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. Rev. 1599
(1991) [hereinafter Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral]; MacKinnon, supra note 17; Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on
Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520 (1992); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing
Theory, Doctrine, and Practice to Life, 91 MicH. L. REV. 1977 (1993). See also James Boyle, The
Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. UNIV. L. REv. 1003, 1003 (1985) (complaining that "almost
nobody writes about the peculiar fusion of abstract theoretical aims ... and concrete classroom
experiences" and showing.how abstract critical legal studies theories can be used to teach torts);
Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal
Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992) (showing the relationship between critical legal studies and
clinical approach). See generally Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of
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full implications of the thesis that theory has practical value when the
defenders discuss how theory should be presented and how lawyers
should be educated.19
Yet, persons who are in full possession of their common sense,
such as nonlawyers and first year law students, know that ideally hostil-
ity should not exist between legal practice and legal academia or
between theory and practice.2° Such sensible persons are generally quite
surprised to learn that law schools are highly reluctant to hire "the prac-
titioner," and that, particularly at elite schools, professors often sneer at
books and articles oriented toward practice, doctrine, or (perhaps worst)
teaching.2 Such sensible persons are also surprised to hear that practi-
tioners have relatively little respect for many law school professors or
their theories.22
In this Article I urge that practice and even the most abstract theory
are complementary, not contradictory. They can and should be inte-
grated symbiotically. Thus, I vehemently reject many practitioners'
position that abstract legal theory is generally useless intellectual self-
indulgence. I similarly reject the extremist academic view that legal
practice is brain-deadening and merits minimal attention in law
schools.23 Rather, I believe that even the most seemingly "high fallutin"
theories can provide practical assistance to lawyers solving "nuts and
bolts" real world problems.
Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992). In a related context, Professor
Blasi has recently argued that theories of cognitive science may be applied to teach practical
lawyering skills. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science,
and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995). This article generalizes and builds
upon these works.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 320-337.
20. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said in 1897: "Theory is the most important part of the
dogma of the law .... It is not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the competent, it simply means
going to the bottom of the subject." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv.
457, 477 (1897).
21. See, e.g., J. Cunyon Gordon, A Response from the Visitor from Another Planet, 91 MICH.
L. REv. 1953, 1958-60 (1993) (a partner at a large firm, writing of her experience as a visiting
lecturer, describes the mutual disdain in which practitioners and academics hold one another).
22. At this point it seems appropriate to confess that I was inspired to write this article, in
part, by my own transition from legal practitioner to legal academic. Having practiced for eight
years, I decided to follow through on my long term goal to become a law school professor. I
found my friends in practice quite skeptical of my plan. They essentially told me legal academia
was a useless enterprise, and that I should not waste my talents writing articles that only a handful
of other legal academics would read. I soon found that legal academics often have an equally, if
not more, unflattering view of practice. After eight years of practice (in my mind not a terribly
long period of time), the one question I could count on getting from academics was: "Why did
you wait so long?" My friends in academia explained the reigning view that too much practice is
brain-deadening. I vowed at that point to work to bridge the very wasteful and frustrating gap
between theory and practice.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 182-319.
[Vol. 50:707
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Specifically, I advocate a common sense jurisprudence toward law
and its practical applications.24 This jurisprudence includes three basic
tenets. First, it contends that theories should be drawn from real world
phenomena.25 Second, it posits that theorists should attempt to devise
solutions that have some chance of success given existing political and
economic conditions.26 Third, the common sense jurisprudence calls
upon theorists to explain or package their works so as to make them
accessible and useful to practicing attorneys.27
Given my thesis it would be ironic and disappointing if I merely
argued, as an abstract matter, that there can be a complementary rela-
tionship between abstract theory and practice. Instead, I will use a real
world example to demonstrate how abstract theories can assist the prac-
titioner. Specifically, I will take as a hypothetical the subject of my last
article: whether mandatory testing of pregnant women for the HIV virus
should be allowed.28 I will then examine some of the insights that may
be gleaned by applying to this problem three sets of abstract theories:
law and economics, critical legal studies, and feminist theory.29
I believe that more interaction between theory and practice will not
only benefit practitioners, but will also benefit theorists. Legal theorists
can make their work more powerful by focusing on real world problems,
viable solutions, and effective communication with practitioners. Legal
24. Significantly, in the world of physical science, whereas transcendent theories used to be
regarded as the most valuable type of scholarship, there is now an increased appreciation for
applied works which focus on reality. Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of
Law Teaching in a Democracy, 41 DurE L.J. 741, 803 (1992).
25. A well developed body of feminist methodology that focuses in part on context and
deriving theories from real world experiences. While a serious review of this literature is beyond
the scope of this article, I discuss feminist methodology in somewhat greater detail infra at text
accompanying notes 282-286. See generally Introduction to FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS 529-36 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (discussing feminist methodological works
by Catherine A. MacKinnon, Elizabeth M. Schneider, Mary Jane Mossman, Katharine T. Bartlett,
Lucinda M. Finley, Marie Ashe, and Patricia J. Williams).
26. Dreaming has some potential value, in that solutions once thought impractical or even
impossible may sometimes turn out to be very practical indeed. After all, the circumnavigation of
the world, the elimination of slavery, and the grant of voting and property rights to women all
came about through dreaming. Nonetheless, theorists should devote more of their efforts to
solutions with the greatest opportunity for success.
27. Abstract theorists are like huge manufacturers in that they churn out large amounts of
difficult-to-handle products. If these manufacturers refuse to package their products for the end
user, the practitioner, and if no retailer steps in to fill the need, the production efforts will be
largely wasted.
28. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Non-Anonymous Testing of Newborns for HIV: Should It
Ever Be Allowed?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 373 (1994).
29. I could not possibly, in this single article, do full justice to each of these enormous fields
and their potential contributions. Nonetheless, I hope to provide examples of how abstract theory
can be applied to concrete problems and to inspire others to take this analysis further. Of course, a
few scholars have already begun to develop just such applied analyses. See supra note 18, and
infra note 270 and accompanying text.
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theories cannot, or at least should not, arise wholly formed from intellec-
tual contemplation. Instead, such theories are and should be drawn from
real world phenomena.3 0 By recognizing the real world origins of their
theories, by seeking viable solutions to problems, and by clearly present-
ing their theories to practitioners, legal academicians can make their the-
ories more cogent and more useful.3'
I do not mean to suggest that critics who see abstract theory and
practice as currently opposed to one another are simply mistaken.
Rather, such critics are responding to an actual phenomenon: the
absence of an extensive and accessible body of applied theory. Thus,
the proper solution to the perceived conflict between theory and practice
is not simply to substitute practice for theory, nor is it to remain smugly
content with the status quo. Instead, both academics and practitioners
must strive to integrate theory and practice more fully. As academics,
we must develop and cogently present the applications of our theories.
Similarly, students and practitioners must not assume that all academic
work is pointy-headed nonsense but rather should be willing to look to
academia for new and creative solutions to real world legal problems.
Practitioners who fail to do so are failing to zealously represent their
clients.
The common sense appeal of a symbiotic relationship between the-
ory and practice is so strong that some may respond that my thesis is
neither novel nor profound. At one level this is probably true. When
pressed, most theoreticians would have to admit that practice has some
ultimate relevance and use. 2 At minimum, legal theorists would likely
all agree that their work derives from real world phenomena, as opposed
to otherworldly sources. Similarly most practitioners would have to
admit that at least a few academic theories in the history of the world
have proved useful in practice.33 Yet, examination of theoreticians' and
30. This idea is not new. See infra text accompanying notes 48-55 (contrasting classical and
modem views of theory); Holmes, supra note 20, at 460-61, 477-78 (arguing that while we need
more theories in the law, such theories must be derived from reality); see also THOMAS HoBBES,
LEVIATHAN 113 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651) ("[T]he privilege of Absurdity" belongs to
"no living creature . . . but man on[ ]ly. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that
professe Philosophy.").
31. See infra text accompanying notes 181-321.
32. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial
Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1929,
1936 (1993) (recognizing that interdisciplinary research can contribute to doctrinal work and is
also valuable when trying "to understand best how the law can advance the interests of society").
33. A law review article written in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis is often
credited for playing a critical role in the development of a constitutional right to privacy. See
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890), and
the discussion thereof in JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONsTrrunONAL LAW 734-35 (2d ed. 1993).
Guido Calabresi had a similar effect on the analysis of tort law with economics. See GuiDo
[Vol. 50:707
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practitioners' behavior disproves the pollyannish view that theory and
practice have already been properly integrated. As a general rule,
today's theorists scorn rather than embrace practice. They believe that
practitioner-oriented education should play a minimal role in law school;
they do not view the immediate purpose of theory as assisting practition-
ers or policymakers; they do not attempt to write their theory in a style,
nor publish it in a forum, geared to assist practitioners in their work. For
the most part they seldom integrate practical applications into their dis-
cussions of legal theory. 34 Similarly, today's practitioners rarely look to
legal academics or theorists for assistance. They often scorn theoretical
efforts as useless without actually having read the works. To the extent
practitioners do look at law review articles, they use such articles pri-
marily as a source for citations, rather than as a source of academic
enlightenment or theory.35 Judges make somewhat more use of legal
scholarship, but are influenced most by the articles granted lower status
in academia: doctrinal pieces that summarize a particular area of law or
call for certain legislative changes. 36 Nor is there evidence that legisla-
tors base any policy debates on the latest purely theoretical writings by
followers of such schools as critical legal studies, law and economics, or
feminist legal theory.37
Section I establishes the background context for this discussion.
First, Section I(A) provides my definitions for the terms "theory," "prac-
tice," and "doctrine," while briefly discussing my definitions in the con-
text of philosophers' definitions of related terms over the years.38
Section I(B) then provides an historical examination of the relationship
between theory and practice in American legal education.39 In Sections
II and III, I detail critics' current attack on legal education4" and the
CALABRESI, THm COST OF ACC1DENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). Frank I.
Michelman's discussion of property rights in Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967), was cited
favorably by the Supreme Court in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 436 U.S. 104,
128 (1978).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 160-181.
35. See, e.g., Max Stier et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A
Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1467, 1485-87 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 35 ("[I]t is my impression that judges, administrators,
legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the [impractical] scholarship that is now
produced by members of the academy."); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law
Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 319 (1989); Stier et al., supra note 35, at 1482-86.
37. The survey prepared by Max Stier and others, supra note 35, does not even include an
analysis of the use of law review articles by legislators. However, one may reasonably presume
that busy legislators and their aides rely on such articles less frequently than do practicing
attorneys.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 48-57.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 58-107.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 109-159.
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academy's response,4 ' focusing particularly on the desired relationship
between theory and practice. Section IV next sets out my own view that
theory and practice should be linked through a jurisprudence of applica-
tions, and supports this view by applying three abstract theories to a
current legal problem. 2 Finally Section V details steps academics, prac-
titioners, and students should take to further a jurisprudence of
applications.43
I hope this Article will help make the potential symbiotic relation-
ship between abstract legal theory and practice a reality. My not so
modest goal is to inspire practitioners, policymakers, judges, and aca-
demics to embrace one another (at least figuratively), and to turn what
today is too often hostility and disrespect into a strong, respectful, mutu-
ally beneficial relationship.
I further believe that by better linking theory and practice we can
gradually move toward a more just society. 44 A theory that ignores real
world problems and real world solutions is inherently elitist, as are legal
institutions that refuse to focus on such problems. But just as the
problems are linked, so too may be the solutions. Perhaps as we begin
to recognize the importance of using theory to address such problems as
oppression and poverty we will begin to make our legal institutions
themselves more just. As we refocus our curriculum and writing,45 and
as we revise our hiring and admissions practices,46 we may allow previ-
ously silenced voices to be heard more clearly.47
II. SETrING THE CONTEXT
A. Defining Theory and Practice
Many great philosophers have focused on the nature of theory and
practice, and the relationship between the two. Classical philosophers
41. See infra text accompanying notes 160-181.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 182-319.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 320-344.
44. Colleague Meg Baldwin distinguishes between my "efficiency" thesis, which seeks to
help theorists and practitioners better meet their existing goals, and this normative thesis.
45. Cf. BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM
20-21, 41 (1994) (claiming that "engaged pedagogy necessarily values student expression" and
cultural diversity within that student body).
46. See, e.g., DEREK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY 77 (1994) (discussing how even law
schools that begin to hire minorities try to hire minorities whose credentials and views are most
similar to those possessed by the majority).
47. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983)
(arguing that lawyers can work together to transform society).
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such as Aristotle distinguished theoretical inquiry, the study of truth for
its own sake, from either productive or practical inquiry, and regarded
pure theory as the highest and purest form of knowledge.4" More mod-
em philosophers including Kant,4 9 Hegel,50 Marx,51 and Arendt5 2 have
focused substantial attention on the proper relation between theory (pure
reason) and the practical or physical world (praxis), generally recogniz-
ing that theory and practice are intertwined. 3 Whereas empiricists con-
tended that all theories must be testable and capable of verification by
experiment,5 4 postmodernists challenge this view, arguing that there is
no real distinction between objective verifiable facts and subjective nor-
mative views.55
For purposes of this Article, I will be less ambitious in defining
theory, practice and doctrine. I define theory as a general proposition or
set of general propositions used either to explain or predict certain phe-
nomena or to critique certain phenomena and call for change. In the
context of legal analysis, theory, so broadly defined, can be broken into
two subcategories: doctrine and abstract theory. Doctrine, as I shall
employ the term, is a set of general propositions used to define or
48. Martin Ostwald, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS xiv (Martin Ostwald
trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1978); see also NICHOLAS LOBKOWiCz, THEORY AND PRACTICE: HISTORY OF
A CONCEPT FROM ARISTOTLE TO MARX (1967) 3-46; T. Ball, Plato and Aristotle: The Unity
Versus the Autonomy of Theory and Praxis, in POLITICAL THEORY AND PRAXIS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES 57 (Terence Ball ed., 1977).
49. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max Miller trans., 2d ed. 1905) (1781);
IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WON'T WORK IN
PRACTICE (E.B. Ashton trans., 1974) (1793); see also LOBKOwIcz, supra note 48, at 120-39
(discussing Kant's works on theory and practice).
50. See LOBKOWICZ, supra note 48, at 143-81 (discussing Hegel's views on theory and
practice). Lobkowicz argues that the theory/practice relation, treated by Hegel in terms of the
opposition between is and ought, is "one of the cardinal points on which Hegel's whole
philosophy turns." Id. at 143.
51. See, e.g., KARL MARX, Theses on Feuerbach, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 400-01 (Loyd D. Easton & Kurt H. Gadded eds. & trans., 1967) (1888)
(critiquing Feuerbach's philosophy for failing to focus on sensuous human activity-i.e.
"Praxis"); see also LOBKOWICZ, supra note 48, at 239-426 (discussing Marx's views on theory
and practice).
52. See Richard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt: The Ambiguities of Theory and Practice, in
POLITICAL THEORY AND PRAXIS: NEW PERSPECTIVES 141 (Terence Ball ed., 1977) (discussing
views of theory and practice expressed by Arendt in such works as THE HUMAN CONDITION
(1955)).
53. See also JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE (John Viertel trans., 1973); Dennis
M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937 (1990)
(applying Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy in an argument for a pragmatic narrative view of
law); see generally RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1976).
54. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 53, at xv; Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice In Legal
Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 596-97 (1987).
55. See generally POSTMODERNISM AND LAW (Dennis Patterson ed., 1994).
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describe an existing body of cases. It is a form of theory in the sense
that it consists of general propositions. Doctrine attempts to categorize
and describe a group of decided cases with a limited set of principles.
However, doctrine is drawn only from the decided cases or from stat-
utes. Pure doctrinal analysis does not seek to criticize or defend the
rules, but only to describe them. Although a doctrine may be used to
criticize a particular outcome as inconsistent with the prevailing rule of
law, doctrine does not direct, critique, or challenge the prevailing rules.
Abstract theory on the other hand, as I will use the term, is rooted
outside of the decided cases. A fully developed abstract theory, for
example, may be based on a body of work from a discipline outside of
law. The discipline of law and economics, for example, analyzes legal
cases and statutes pursuant to the theories developed by economists.
Alternatively, an abstract theory may be based on a less developed pol-
icy perspective. One might theorize, for example, that changes in the
phases of the moon cause judges and jurors to issue certain kinds of
decisions. While quite possibly unfounded, this would be a nondoctrinal
theory.
Because abstract theory is based outside of legal doctrine, it is criti-
cal by nature. That is, if an abstract theory based on something other
than legal doctrine is applied to a body of legal doctrine it will reveal
ways in which the doctrine might evolve or change entirely. Economic
theory, for example, can be used to advocate making doctrinal rules of
law more "efficient." Alternatively, an abstract theory such as critical
legal studies, that does not espouse a single substantive result, can still
be used to provide insights that will allow legal doctrine to evolve and
change.
Finally legal practice, as I use the term, refers simply to the actual
use of legal concepts and processes by lawyers, clients, judges, and leg-
islators. Thus, legal practice includes both private practice (in which
lawyers are retained to represent particular clients), and public practice
(the development of law by legislators and the interpretation of law by
courts).
When I call for a common sense jurisprudence linking the theory
and practice of law I ask that academics direct their theories toward both
private and public practitioners. I do not consider a theory to be practi-
cally-oriented merely because it discusses a legal issue that arose at least
once in practice. Virtually all theories do at least that. Rather, a theoret-
ical approach fitting the parameters suggested in this Article should
address the issues that arise in practice and that are significant, from a
societal perspective. Significance should be measured not by the degree
of intellectual stimulation the problem presents to the theoretician, but
[Vol. 50:707
1996] SYMBIOTIC LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL PRACTICE 719
rather in terms of benefits to be provided to others.56 Further, to be
practical a theory must also present approaches that are economically,
politically, and otherwise viable in the real world.57 It must also be
presented in terms that can be easily digested and applied by legal
practitioners.
B. A Brief Historical Summary of Legal Education in the
United States
Practitioners and theoreticians have been fighting over the purpose
and appropriate nature of legal education in the United States for a long
time. 58 By studying changes in legal education in the United States59
56. While I recognize that such "significance" can be measured very differently, depending
upon one's social theory, I demand only that the theoretician believe her own work to be socially
significant.
57. I do, however, recognize that the links to practice may take some time to develop, and that
we must make some room in academia for theories that presently appear impractical.
58. See generally JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
258-85 (1950) (comparing those modes of legal education that treated law as part of a liberal
education and also those modes oriented to the practice of law); ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICAN FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s (1983); see also James
P. Rowles, Toward Balancing the Goals of Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 375, 394 (1981)
(pointing out that student criticisms of law school education trace back at least to the 1930s). The
practice/theory tension exists in other disciplines as well. E. Gordon Gee & Donald W. Jackson,
Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 695, 762-838
(finding tension between theory and practice in fields of education such as business, medicine, and
accounting).
59. Legal education in other countries is both similar to and different from our own. As one
commentator has noted, whereas U.S. law schools focus on educating attorneys, many European
law schools focus on educating judges, and, perhaps for that reason, take an approach more
synthetic and doctrinally oriented than our own. See generally Richard Stith, Can Practice Do
Without Theory? Differing Answers in Western Legal Education, 4 INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1
(1993). Significantly, tension between legal theory and legal practice has emerged in other
countries as well. See, e.g., Alexander J. Black, Separated by a Common Law: American and
Scottish Legal Education, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 15 (1993); Gee & Jackson, supra note
58, at 762-838 (finding tension between theory and practice in the British legal system); Juergen
R. Ostertag, Legal Education in Germany and the United States-A Structural Comparison, 26
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1993) (discussing tension between theory and practice in German
and American systems); Symposium, Winds of Change-A Global Look at Legal Education, 72
OR. L. REV. 941 (1993) (including articles discussing the system of legal education in England
and Wales, Germany, Hungary, Russia, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Japan, and noting the
presence or absence of skills training in each system); Sandra R. Klein, Comment, Legal
Education in the United States and England: A Comparative Analysis, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 601 (1991). While a detailed examination of other countries' legal education systems
is beyond the scope of this article, it is significant that many other countries have sought to resolve
this tension by creating an apprenticeship period for law school graduates. See, e.g., Joanne
Fedler, Legal Education in South Africa, 72 OR. L. REv. 999, 1008 (1993) (graduates must either
perform articles of clerkship or perform community service and complete a four-month practical
course); Francis A. Gabor, Legal Education in Hungary, 72 OR. L. REV. 957, 961 (1993) (upon
completion of course work Hungarian law students must first complete a six month
apprenticeship, then defend their dissertation and take comprehensive exams, and then complete
another apprenticeship of two or three years before taking the bar exam); Lisa A. Granik, Legal
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over the years, as well as criticisms of the alternative versions of legal
education that have existed, we can learn some important lessons for the
future. However, in no period in our history of legal education have we
adequately blended the role of abstract theory and practice.
When this country declared its independence there were no law
schools. Lawyers were educated through general liberal arts studies and
then through apprenticeships to practicing attorneys. 60 Liberal arts stud-
ies provided general training in morality and ethics, as well as in writing.
Apprenticeships then focused on very practical skills, rather than on the-
oretical approaches to legal argument or on theoretical critiques of the
legal system. 61 There were no law review articles.62
Although there is no doubt that apprenticeship produced some
excellent attorneys, the practice was criticized at the time, and also retro-
spectively, for failing to provide enough doctrinal and theoretical train-
ing.63 The pure apprenticeship system was thought by some to place too
much emphasis on "nuts and bolts," thereby failing to provide future
attorneys with the analytic tools to be sufficiently creative.
When the first law schools were founded, beginning in the late
eighteenth century,' 4 their primary aim was to provide fit leaders for our
new legal and political institutions. 65 Whereas leaders of Great Britain
Education in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, 72 OR. L. REv. 963, 971 (1993) (Russian law
students must complete a summer-long practicum); Ross Nankivell, Legal Education in Australia,
72 OR. L. REv. 983, 984 (1993) (no Australian state has a bar exam but all require graduates to
complete professional training before entering practice); Constance O'Keefe, Legal Education in
Japan, 72 OR. L. REv. 1009, 1011-13 (1993) (all those who seek to actually practice law must
spend two years at a special institute emphasizing litigation and practical experience and must
rotate through a series of apprenticeships); Ostertag, supra, at 305, 332-38 (German system relies
on a two-and-a-half year preparatory service following graduation to teach students necessary
skills); Clive Walker, Legal Education in England and Wales, 72 OR. L. REv. 943, 945 (1993)
(following graduation law students in England and Wales must complete an apprenticeship of one
or two years).
60. See Gee & Jackson, supra note 58, at 722-23; see also STEVENS, supra note 58, at 3;
Warren E. Burger, Some Further Reflections on the Problem of Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49
FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 2 (1980); Carrington, supra note 24, at 760.
61. Gee & Jackson, supra note 58, at 722-25; see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 97-98, 318-19 (2d ed. 1985); HURST, supra note 58, at 256-57;
STEVENS, supra note 58, at 3-34 (discussing transition from apprenticeship to law school as
accepted mode of legal education).
62. For example, Harvard's well-respected review did not begin publishing until more than
100 years after the American Revolution, in 1887. 1 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1887). See generally
FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 630-31 (discussing earliest law reviews).
63. See Burger, supra note 60, at 2 (claiming that apprenticeships resulted in inadequate
training in legal theory); Gee & Jackson, supra note 58, at 731.
64. The first private law school established was the Litchfield School, which opened in 1784.
Gee & Jackson, supra note 58, at 726. The first law schools existed concurrently with the
apprenticeship system. Id. at 722. Even in the new law schools the emphasis was practical rather
than theoretical. Id. at 731. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 319-20.
65. Carrington, supra note 24, at 748, 757.
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had derived their status from royal blood or from inherited positions of
power, our leaders would derive their status from their perceived ability
to serve as moral leaders.66 Significantly, law schools in this early era
did not emphasize technical competence, but rather focused on broad
moral training.67
In the late 1800's, with the rise in professionalism, Harvard Law
School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell initiated a significant
change in legal education. Langdell's revolutionary curriculum focused
on law as a science, and was based almost exclusively on the study of
appellate cases.68 Langdell's focus on law as science rejected both the
apprenticeship and the moral leader versions of preexisting legal educa-
tion.69 Thus Langdell stated:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doc-
trines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them
with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer.7 °
Although initially quite controversial, by the 1920s and 1930s Lang-
dell's appellate approach to legal education was well ensconced in law
schools throughout the country. 7'
The Langdellian approach can be viewed as both theoretical and
practical.72 In contrast to the apprenticeship system it seems theoretical,
in that it seeks to apply general rules of science to law. Yet, the
Langdellian case method, based on decided cases, can also be viewed as
66. Id. at 757-60.
67. Id. at 757. Cf. STEVENS, supra note 58, at 1-36 (noting that the emphasis of early law
school education was on liberal arts).
68. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOLS 9-17 (1914). But see STEVENS, supra note 58, at 3-4, 36 (arguing that Litchfield
began teaching "law as science" in 1784 and also deemphasizing the contributions of Langdell).
69. Rejecting the practical, Langdell stated: " 'What qualifies a person to teach law is not
experience in the work of a lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in
the trial or argument of causes-not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in learning
law.'" Jerome Frank, Why Nor A Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907, 908 (1933)
(quoting Langdell).
70. REDLICH, supra note 68, at 11 (emphasis ignored) (quoting C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871)).
71. Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 405,443 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 197 1) (In 1924, Theodore Woolsey of
Yale stated: "'The old way bred great lawyers, but like the caste mark of the Brahmin, the case
system is the cachet of the crack law school of today.' ") (citation omitted); FRIEDMAN, supra note
61, at 615-20 (Langdell's approach was initially rejected by students, professors, and
practitioners, but it came to be accepted because it supported the prestige and independence of
legal learning). At the same time, law schools increasingly became part of universities, with
fewer law schools remaining freestanding institutions. Edward S. Godfrey, Legal Education and
the University (Part 1), 18 ALB. L. REV. 137, 139 (1954).
72. Spiegel, supra note 54, at 581-86.
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a practical, systemic method for teaching the skill of case analysis. 73
Langdell's "scientific" case method approach has been subjected to
harsh criticism. The Carnegie Commission sponsored two studies,
known as the Redlich Report of 191474 and the Reed Report of 1921,75
each of which found significant problems with and limitations to the
Langdellian approach, including its failure to address adequately the
practical side of law.76 Also, beginning in the 1920s, the Legal Realist
movement challenged both Langdell's insistence that legal principles
could be objectively deduced from appellate cases and the Langdellian
abandonment of practical training. 77 Today, the Langdellian emphasis
on appellate cases continues to be criticized for rejecting the importance
of facts as building blocks for arguments and cases,78 and thus overem-
phasizing the importance of one set of legal skills (analysis) to the exclu-
sion of others.79
In a sense, the Legal Realists blended theory and practice. On the
one hand, many Legal Realists such as Frank and Llewellyn urged that
law schools train practicing lawyers.80 At the same time, Legal Realists
were far more theoretical than the Langdellians, drawing on social sci-
ence theories in their analysis of legal institutions.81 Yet, the Legal
Realists did not truly blend theory and practice in the manner urged in
this Article. Specifically, they did not attempt to present their new
social science theories in a form that could be used by practicing
attorneys.
Although the Legal Realists surely influenced legal education, they
were not able to topple the Langdellian focus on appellate cases. While
73. Id. at 585-86.
74. REDLICH, supra note 68.
75. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1921).
76. See STEVENs, supra note 58, at 112-30. The Redlich Report criticized overuse of the case
method approach, particularly as applied to non-common law courses and upper-level students.
REDLICH, supra note 68, at 50. The Reed Report argued that there should be a variety of modes of
legal education, and that while the case method might work well enough at Harvard it did not
work well, for example, in the fast growing night school sector of law schools. REED, supra note
75, at 381.
77. Although the Langdellian approach emphasized legal doctrine, which clearly has its
source in practice, critics argued that the "scientific" approach failed to provide necessary
knowledge and skills. See, e.g., THE COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE PLACE OF SKILLS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1944), reprinted in 45
COLUM. L. REv. 345 (1945) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN REPORT]; Frank, supra note 69, at 910-12
(1933) (criticizing the Langdellian teaching method for failing to teach many of the skills needed
by practicing lawyers).
78. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 60, at 3.
79. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984).
80. Spiegel, supra note 54, at 586-87.
81. Id. at 586.
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some of those professors who sympathized with the Legal Realist per-
spective introduced new teaching methods and materials, the vast major-
ity of schools continued to use either the case method or a modified case
method, and to teach primarily from appellate cases.82
Meanwhile, a gradual evolution was taking place in the nature of
legal scholarship. Specifically, law professors began to write many
more articles, and many more theoretical pieces. 3 Whereas law review
articles had initially been short, straightforward, primarily practice-ori-
ented pieces, geared to assist practicing lawyers or judges in solving
specific legal problems,84 the new articles were much lengthier, more
theoretical, more heavily footnoted, and more oriented to fellow aca-
demics than to practicing lawyers, public servants, or judges.8 5
The new style of law review article was not welcomed by all with
open arms. In 1936 Professor Fred Rodell wrote Goodbye to Law
Reviews, published by the University of Virginia Law Review, in which
he stated: "There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing.
One is its style. The other is its content. That, I think, about covers the
ground."'86 As far as content, Rodell opined that law scholarship was
failing adequately to address society's problems or offer helpful solu-
tions. 7 While many others joined Rodell in criticizing the increasingly
obscure nature of law review articles,8 8 the trend toward academization
continued. 9
In the 1970s, perhaps influenced in part by the ferment of the
1960s, numerous additional reports and articles appeared criticizing var-
ious aspects of legal education and scholarship. The reports generally
82. Stevens, supra note 71, at 481-82.
83. See generally Carrington, supra note 24, at 786-92 (arguing that one adverse consequence
of the Langdellian technocratization of law school was isolation of legal study from broader
intellectual efforts, which ultimately led many law professors to teach subjects other than law in
the classroom). Carrington opposes "pure" academicization, which is unrelated to the real world,
and instead urges that professors should again seek to inculcate moral standards and assist public
leaders. See id.
84. See STEVENS, supra note 58, at 270 (showing that early scholarship was primarily
doctrinal and practitioner oriented).
85. Carrington, supra note 24, at 289-90.
86. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 38 (1936) [hereinafter Rodell,
Goodbye]. Notwithstanding Rodell's promise never to write another law review article, in 1962
he wrote a follow up article concluding that the problem had only worsened. He claimed that
whereas law should be used to solve the world's problems, law review articles are largely stuffy,
fluffy, and read only very rarely. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV.
279, 286-90 (1962).
87. Rodell, Goodbye, supra note 86, at 42-43.
88. E.g., STEVENS, supra note 58, at 164 n.13.
89. See generally Carrington, supra note 24, at 789-90; Charles W. Collier, The Use and
Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal
Scholarship, 41 DuKE L.J. 191 (1991).
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focused on the tension between theory and practice in legal education
and criticized law schools for failing adequately to address this problem.
For example, in 1971 the Association of American Law Schools issued
the Carrington Report, urging that the traditional first year curriculum
be replaced with courses focusing on law and social control, legal advo-
cacy, legal doctrine and method, legal decision making, and legal plan-
ning. These courses would be geared to teaching students how to
actually practice law, and would make heavy use of adjunct faculty, rec-
ognizing that "few who select themselves as academic lawyers are moti-
vated by an intense interest in the practical arts."90 Just one year later
the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education issued New Directions
in Legal Education, also known as the Packer-Ehrlich Report, calling
for greater diversification among law schools and urging that the mini-
mum number of years of schooling for a law degree be reduced to two
years as this would be sufficient to provide most students with the basic
knowledge required to practice law, and might allow students to obtain
more specialized training in their third year.91
Then, in 1977, academics Gordon E. Gee and Donald W. Jackson
published their voluminous study based on personal investigation of ten
law schools.92 Finding a ubiquitous tension between theory and prac-
tice, 93 Gee and Jackson observed that "[t]he desired objective that his-
tory perhaps provides us is the capacity to steer a course between the
Scylla of 'practical experience' and the Charybdis of 'systematic aca-
demic preparation.' "91 They concluded that "It]he solution-and the
problem-is to make theory and other non-bread-and-butter knowledge
useful. 95
Two years later, in 1979, the ABA Section on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar issued the Cramton Report, specifically criticiz-
ing law schools' inattention to training and lawyering skills.96 Mean-
while, also in the 1970s and into the 1980s, Chief Justice Burger wrote
numerous articles and gave many speeches attacking the competency of
practicing lawyers. He was particularly critical with respect to their
practice skills, and blamed that incompetency primarily on law schools'
90. Training for the Public Professions of the Law, 1971 Ass'N AM. L. SCHS. ANN. MEETING
§ II, reprinted in HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION app. at 111-12, 130-31 (1972).
91. PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 90, at 77.
92. Gee & Jackson, supra note 58, at 70.
93. Id. at 927-28.
94. Id. at 761.
95. Id. at 962.
96. See STEVENS, supra note 58, at 240 (discussing Report and Recommendations of the Task
Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law Schools, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSION TO B. (the Cramton Report)).
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failure to provide adequate practical training. 97
Notwithstanding the very substantial scorn heaped upon law
schools by various legal institutions, legal scholars, and even the Chief
Justice, the basic law school curriculum changed very little from the
1970s into the 1990s.98 Perhaps the most noteworthy change in the typi-
cal law school curriculum during that period was the addition of clinical
education. 99 And yet, even the addition of some clinical education has
not made a tremendous difference in terms of students' overall exper-
iences. Not all students are provided with the opportunity to take even a
single clinical course, 00 and clinical faculty are still treated like second-
class, or perhaps third-class, citizens among law school faculty.' °
At the same time, the 1970s and 1980s gave birth to some exciting
new interdisciplinary approaches, including critical legal studies, law
and economics, feminist theory, and critical race theory. 02 The conflu-
ence of the growth of those theories with the call by some for more
practical and more ethical legal education, heightened preexisting ten-
sions between theory and practice in legal education, and called into
question the proper purpose of legal education.
Interestingly and unsurprisingly, the Boyer Report, produced in
1990 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,10 3
revealed that the basic trends identified in this Article with respect to
legal education can be found generally in the development of higher
education in the United States. Specifically, the Boyer Report found that
97. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227 (1973);
see also Burger, supra note 60, at 22 (taking an unfavorable view of legal education compared to
medical education, and proposing more clinical and apprenticeship-type training for lawyers as a
means of combining the best of the various eras of legal education).
98. See, e.g., Comments of Roger Cramton (former Dean at Cornell Law School), D.C.
Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 211 ("The truth is that legal education is much the same as it
was fifty years ago. The real complaint is that law schools are stuck in a hundred-year old rut.").
99. Karl E. Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 336, 342 (1982); Marjorie A. McDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the Basement:
In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 239, 242 n. 16 (1990) (noting
that by 1979, 80% of American law schools offered some form of clinical program, 58% of those
being in-house clinics). But cf. Priest, supra note 12, at 437 (arguing that the most important
development in legal scholarship in the past fifty years has been "specializ[ation] according to the
separate social sciences").
100. McDiarmid, supra note 99, at 246 (noting that only 30% of law students get live-client
clinical experience).
101. Comments of Emma Jordan (then-president of the Association of American Law
Schools), D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 221.
102. While not all these theories draw on an alternative fully developed discipline, such as
economics, they are "interdisciplinary" in the sense that they draw on materials and bodies of
thought not traditionally deemed part of legal analysis.
103. ERNEST L. BOYER, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORIATE
(1990).
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from the colonial era to as late as the 1860s, American colleges and
universities focused on teaching students to be civic and religious lead-
ers. 104 Then, beginning in the 1820s and particularly with the establish-
ment of land grant colleges in the 1860s, colleges and universities began
emphasizing public service.10 5 Subsequently, particularly in the late
nineteenth century, American institutions of higher learning began to
emphasize "pure" or basic scientific research.106 These trends roughly
parallel the path of American legal education: from apprenticeships to
law schools oriented toward producing societal leaders, to the Langdel-
lian emphasis on "scientific" study of legal principles.107
This overview of legal education in the United States allows us to
draw some significant conclusions with respect to the relationship
between theory and practice. First, although a number of different sys-
tems of legal education have attempted to resolve the tension between
theory and practice, none has proved totally successful. So, as we
address alternative programs, we should place such proposals in histori-
cal context, thereby avoiding reinvention of wheels that have already
gone flat. Second, history reveals that the current academic emphasis on
pure theory, and particularly interdisciplinary theory, is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Thus, we should not be afraid to challenge this
emphasis or at least contemplate adjusting the emphasis. Third, and
most significantly, although theory and practice historically have been
emphasized in varying degrees, and although many people in practice
and academia have abstractly urged integration of theory and practice,
no period has particularly emphasized the development of a jurispru-
dence to foster the application of abstract theory to practice. These con-
cepts will be developed in further detail in Section IV.
III. CURRENT ATrACKS ON LEGAL ACADEMIA AND LEGAL THEORY
While practitioners and theoreticians have long been fighting over
the purpose and appropriate nature of legal education,"0 8 there is a gen-
eral consensus among both the supporters and detractors of modern legal
education that the gap between practice and academia has widened in
recent years. 10 9 This widening gap has inspired increasingly frequent
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id. at 4-5.
106. Id. at 6-7.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 58-73.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 58-102.
109. See, e.g., D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 201-22 (Dean Robert Pitofsky, Judge
Harry Edwards, Dean Roger Cramton, and Professor and AALS President Emma Jordan all
agreed that the gap between legal practice and law teaching has widened in recent years); Stevens,
supra note 14, at 444-45 (claiming that given the tremendous gap between theory and practice,
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and intense attacks toward both legal classroom education and legal
scholarship."t 0 Although there are of course interrelationships between
the criticisms of teaching on the one hand and scholarship on the other,
it is helpful to examine the two sets of criticisms separately. In Section
A, I will analyze current attacks on legal teaching. In Section B, I will
examine current attacks on legal scholarship.
A. Attacks on Legal Teaching
Law school instruction is currently under attack from all corners.
Practitioners complain that law schools are failing to teach students
skills they will need to practice law; ztI judges complain that law schools
are failing to provide students with the training they will need to appear
competently in court. =12  Even some legal academics have joined the
fray, agreeing that current law school curriculum and teaching method-
ology are resulting in ill-prepared graduates." 3  While many critics
focus on law schools' alleged failure to convey a variety of practical
legal academics must take care not to render themselves totally irrelevant); Wellington, supra note
7 (concluding that although there "was no disfunction between legal education and the legal
profession," when he started teaching, there is presently a significant gap). Compare George L.
Priest, The Increasing Division Between Legal Practice and Legal Education, 37 BuFF. L. REv.
681, 683 (1987) (celebrating the division between practice and theory) with Priest, supra note 32,
at 1944 (concluding that interdisciplinary work and doctrinal work should be regarded as
functionally cooperative, rather than antithetical).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 111-181. The increasing popularity of clinical
education can, however, be seen as a contrary trend. See generally McDiarmid, supra note 99
(analyzing the current status of clinical education).
111. See, e.g., MacCrate Report, supra note 3, at 5; Kathy Biehl, Things They Didn't Teach in
Law School, 75 A.B.A. J. 52, 52-55 (1989) (lamenting that typical law school programs leave
graduates unprepared for their first years of firm employment); D'Alemberte, supra note 5, at 52
(claiming that legal education, as currently structured with limited contacts between schools and
practitioners, does not benefit either the profession or the students); Joseph M. McLaughlin, Law
Schools Must Demand that Students Learn Law, B. LEADER, July-Aug. 1975, at 17, 19 (giving
examples of "maladies of legal education," as law school dean, and exhorting the profession to
"speak out" with criticisms).
112. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 60, at 20-21 (law schools' failure to train future lawyers
adequately is resulting in poor trial skills); Edwards, supra note 3; Harry T. Edwards, The Role of
Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 285, 285 (1988) (arguing that legal
education "is falling short of any meaningful effort to 'shape the legal profession' "); Sherman G.
Finesilver, The Tension Between Practical and Theoretical Legal Education: A Judge's View of
the Gap, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1062-63. But see Carl McGowan, The University Law
School and Practical Education, 65 A.B.A. J. 374, 378 (1979) (claiming that law schools are
doing a fine job of educating future attorneys and should continue to focus on theory rather than
practical skills-based training).
113. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 79; Roger C. Cramton, The Current State of the Law
Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 330 (1982) (claiming current law school curriculum is
neither sufficiently theoretical nor sufficiently practical); John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal
Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC.
343 (1989); Klare, supra note 99, at 336; A. Kenneth Pye, Legal Education in an Era of Change:
The Challenge, 1987 DuKE L.J. 191, 197-200. See generally GLENDON, supra note 4 (arguing that
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skills, others attack law schools for failing to instill morality or for fail-
ing adequately to study the place of law in society.' 1 4
Those who argue that law schools are failing to provide students
with necessary practical skills often contend that law schools are over-
emphasizing explication of appellate cases and spending insufficient
time on other necessary skills.' 1 5 Litigators, such as Professor and for-
mer Dean Anthony Amsterdam, focus on additional talents needed in
practice including fact-finding, problem-solving, and negotiation, and
urge that these subjects can and should be taught in law school through
clinical and other courses.'1 6 Amsterdam, as well as such other academ-
ics as James Boyd White, urge that the primary goal of law school
should be to teach its graduates how to learn law on their own and how
to make new law. 17
Meanwhile, some professors are advocating more reliance on a
problem oriented or "transactional" approach that requires students to
engage in more role playing exercises, to examine actual business docu-
current law school curriculum is too focused on teaching students to make adversarial arguments
as to "rights" and insufficiently focused on training students to solve common problems).
114. See, e.g.,Talbot D'Alemberte, Keynote Address, The MacCrate Report Conference
Proceedings (Sept. 30 - Oct. 2, 1993) (West Pub.) at 12 ("Law schools are not fulfilling the
mission which I will, without apology, call the seminary mission. They are not teaching law
students about justice, they are not preparing them for a life of 'republican virtue.' "). Some, of
course, criticize legal education both for failing to teach practical skills and for failing to think
critically about morals and politics. See Klare, supra note 99, at 336 ("Law-school education does
not, by and large, train students either to practice law or to engage in serious legal scholarship.
Rather, the law-school curriculum disenfranchises students intellectually and disables and
incapacitates them professionally.").
115. E.g., MacCrate Report, supra note 3, at 138-40 (listing broad array of needed legal
skills). See generally, Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of
Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993) (analyzing survey data regarding what law schools do
and do not teach, and concluding that while law schools do not teach all skills which are needed in
practice, developments in legal academia can sometimes reshape practice); Daniel J. Givelber et
al., Learning Through Work: An Empirical Study of Legal Internship, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 3
(1995) (citing education theory, authors argue that students receive meaningful education through
working part-time and summers for law firms). These calls for more skills training are not
entirely new. In 1944, the LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 77, also criticized complete reliance
on the case method. Id. at 369. It asked law professors to provide students with an advocate's
perspective and to focus on the many skills required of good practitioners. Id.
116. Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 614-15 (cataloguing skills needed in practice). Critics who
contend that law schools are not teaching sufficient litigation-oriented practical skills often praise
clinical education but concede it is not sufficient to provide the practical skills that are needed, at
least as it currently exists at most schools. Such advocates believe that insufficient resources are
devoted to clinical education and that clinical education is too "marginalized" relative to the
standard curriculum. See, e.g., Klare, supra note 99, at 342. Cf. Symposium, Clinical Legal
Education: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Future, 36 CATH. U. L.
REv. 337 (1987) (praising contributions of clinical education).
117. Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 613; James B. White, Doctrine In A Vacuum: Reflections
On What A Law School Ought (And Ought Not) To Be, 36 J. LEGAL Eruc. 155, 162 (1986).
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ments, and to solve problems on behalf of their imaginary clients.' 1 8
Similarly, Professor Mary Ann Glendon recently argued that law schools
are focusing excessively on "rights" arguments and failing to provide
students with the training they require to negotiate solutions for their
clients." 9 The American Bar Association has called for more skills-
oriented legal education as well. In July, 1992, an ABA task force
issued the MacCrate Report,2 1 which concluded that-law schools need
to make significant curricular changes in order to provide students with
more of the skills they will need in practice. While concluding that the
so-called "gap" between theory and practice is better viewed as a "con-
tinuum," with future lawyers acquiring relevant skills before, during,
and also after law school,' 2' the report nonetheless found that law
schools are not doing an adequate job of providing students with the
broad range of skills they will need in practice.' 22 Among the solutions
offered by the MacCrate Report are more clinical and skills training,
providing students with the list of relevant skills so that they can seek
118. E.g., Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42
J. LEGAL EDUC. 241 (1992); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, SECURED CREDIT: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH (1995) (case book using transaction-oriented approach). See generally Tapes
of Workshop on the Transactional Approach to Law, held by the Association of American Law
Schools (Oct. 13-15, 1994) (on file with AALS) (including discussions of how to teach
transaction-oriented courses in such areas as contracts, corporations, secured transactions, and
international business transactions). Significantly, these advocates of a transactional approach do
not spurn legal theory such as law and economics or law and sociology but rather seek to integrate
such theories into a more practically-oriented curriculum. In this they lead the way down the path
advocated in this article.
119. GLENDON, supra note 4. Glendon approvingly quotes Abraham Lincoln's laudatory
remarks about compromise. Id. at 55. She advocates a return to the craftsmanship and common
law tradition espoused by Karl Llewellyn, in order to allow lawyers to better fill society's need for
planners, compromisers, and problem-solvers. Id. at 256-94.
120. MacCrate Report, supra note 3. The report is named after Robert E. MacCrate, Esq.,
Chairperson of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap. The task
force was formed in 1989 by the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, to
address the perceived gap between legal practice and legal education. Id. at 3.
121. Id.
122. Specifically, the report stated that although law schools do quite well in teaching legal
analysis, they do a poor job of teaching nine other basic skills needed by legal practitioners:
problem solving, legal research, factual investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation,
litigation, alternative dispute-resolution procedures, organizing and managing legal work, and
recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas. Id. at 138-40. The MacCrate Report also produced
a list of values which practitioners should possess. Id. at 140-41.
The report relied on (and included as Appendix B) an American Bar Foundation Study by
Bryant G. Garth, Donald D. Landon, and Joanne Martin entitled Learning Lawyering: Where Do
Lawyers Acquire Practice Skills? Based on a survey of Chicago large law firm partners, Chicago
recent bar admittants, and practitioners in rural and mid-sized towns in Missouri, the study
examined knowledge and skills respondents regarded as important to practice, and their view of
the role law schools should play in providing such skills. Respondents from all groups found law
schools could, but nonetheless failed to, provide adequate training in oral communication, written
communication, and drafting. MacCrate Report, supra note 3, app. at 381.
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their own training, and more skills training through post-law school
sources.' 23 Implicit in the report is a belief that while more academic/
theoretical legal scholarship may have value, it cannot significantly pro-
vide practical skills. Remarkably, the ability to master and ultimately
apply abstract theories is nowhere mentioned in the report as important
to attorneys in their day-to-day lives.
Judge Harry T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit also recently wrote a controversial cri-
tique of legal education. 24 His article, entitled The Growing Disjunc-
tion Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, has sparked
intense discussions within academia.'25 Judge Edwards does not mince
words. Instead, using a survey of his own former law clerks for support,
he aims his criticisms directly at the abstract theorists in legal education,
stating:
For some time now, I have been deeply concerned about the growing
disjunction between legal education and the legal profession. I fear
that our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite directions.
The schools should be training ethical practitioners and producing
scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. The
firms should be ensuring that associates and partners practice law in
an ethical manner. But many law schools-especially the so-called
"elite" ones-have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing
abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and
pedagogy. 126
Taking as his premise the idea that the purpose of law school
should be to educate future lawyers, 127 Judge Edwards argues that
because various adherents of "law and" movements,128 as well as of crit-
ical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory, possess
123. MacCrate Report, supra note 3, at 233-72,
124. Edwards, supra note 3. Judge Edwards had previously written The Role of Legal
Education in Shaping the Profession, supra note 112, and has spoken extensively regarding legal
education. See, e.g., D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 202-09.
125. The article has also inspired a major symposium, published at 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921-
2219 (1993), including remarks by many well known academics, judges, and practitioners.
126. Edwards, supra note 3, at 34 (emphasis added). Judge Edwards also criticized the firms
for pursuing profit above all else, and concluded that "[w]hile the schools are moving toward pure
theory, the firms are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle ground-ethical practice-
has been deserted by both. This disjunction calls into question our status as an honorable
profession." Id.
127. Id. at 41 (law schools have a "principal mission of professional scholarship and training").
Judge Edwards explicitly rejects the "graduate school" model of legal education espoused by
George Priest. See Priest, supra note 12, at 441. Edwards states: "For if lawyers are no different
from economists or political scientists, then why do they need J.D.s rather than M.A.s or Ph.D.s?"
Edwards, supra note 3, at 40.
128. Judge Edwards particularly mentions law and economics, law and literature, and law and
sociology, while noting that those are merely examples. Edwards, supra note 3, at 34.
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"a low regard for the practice of law[,] their emergence in legal educa-
tion has produced profound and untoward side effects."' 29 The judge
asserts that students who merely take a variety of pure theory courses
from such professors "will be woefully unprepared for legal practice,"' 130
and that law school students today are receiving a worse doctrinal edu-
cation than students did in past years.' 3 '
Still, Edwards would not banish all theory entirely from the curric-
ulum. He believes that those "practical" theories which use abstract
notions to critique doctrine and cases are useful to practitioners. 32
However, Edwards would replace much of the current abstract theo-
rizing with more doctrinal, practice-oriented teaching, and would also
keep the more theoretical abstract critiques out of the first year
curriculum. 33
Whereas Judge Edwards calls for a return to more doctrinally-ori-
ented education,134 others, who share his belief that law schools need to
do a better job of training practitioners, have offered a variety of pro-
posed solutions including more clinical education, more externships,
increased reliance on problem-solving as well as case analysis, and
establishment of "bridge-the-gap" and other post-law school continuing
education programs. 135 Some have also called for creation of separate
129. Id. at 35; see also D'Alemberte, supra note 5, at 53 (large number of law professors do
not respect practitioners). Cf. Collier, supra note 89, at 194 ("[B]ecause of the radically different
structures of authority in law and humanities, the hope that humanist theory will be able to provide
a source of intellectual authority for law is largely a vain one.").
130. Edwards, supra note 3. at 38.
131. See id. at 58-59. Judge Edwards states that while law students still "receive a rudimentary
doctrinal education . . . [they] often do not receive the full and rich doctrinal education they
deserve." Id. at 58. He decries the "impractical" scholars:
The nihilist scholar, who believes that texts are infinitely plastic and subjective, can
only teach students to destroy legal texts, not to construct them. Similarly, the law-
and-economics scholar, who accepts that doctrine does constrain but is preoccupied
with theory, will not give sustained and subtle attention to cases, statutes and the
like.
Id. at 59-60. Thus, Judge Edwards believes that whenever such a scholar teaches what ought to
be a doctrinal course, the students suffer. While emphasizing the need for doctrinal education,
Judge Edwards also states that there should be more clinical education in the curriculum. Id. at
62.
132. Id. at 35, 65. Edwards would even allow the "impractical" theories to remain part of the
curriculum to a limited degree. He states that though the various identified movements have little
or nothing to contribute to the practice of law, "all of these movements ... have the potential to
serve important educational functions and, therefore, should have a permanent home in the law
schools." Id. at 35.
133. He believes that first year students, who have not yet mastered legal doctrine, are in no
position to understand theoretical critiques. Id. at 39-40.
134. See id. at 62.
135. None of the currently offered "bridge the gap" programs are very extensive. See
MacCrate Report, supra note 3, at 289-99 (discussing several states' programs); see also Burger,
supra note 60, at 7 (urging more apprenticeship and clinical programs). Some have also argued
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tracks for teaching and scholarship, to allow hiring and tenuring of per-
sons who are most competent to engage in the training of future lawyers,
but may not have an interest in or the ability to engage in the type of
scholarship currently required by the Academy. 136
Meanwhile, current law school education has also been criticized
for reasons other than, or in addition to, its failure to teach practical
skills. 37 A number of persons, both within and without academia, have
criticized law schools for failing to produce ethical or moral lawyers.1 38
Relatedly, some have attacked legal classroom education on the ground
that it causes too many students to opt for careers in relatively large
firms rather than in small firms, public interest organizations, or govern-
ment service.' 39 Such critics argue that students, recognizing their own
inadequate preparation, gravitate to the large firms because those firms
are most capable of spending the resources necessary to provide students
with the training they still require. 4 ° Several critics have also suggested
that the widening gap between academia and practice, and particularly
between highly theoretical "law and" approaches and the harsh practi-
calities of the real world, leave law school graduates more vulnerable to
disillusionment and severe job dissatisfaction than they would be if they
received more adequate classroom training.' 4 ' Again, many of these
critics specifically note that were law professors to devote less time to
scholarship or their own pet theories, law graduates might be more ethi-
cal, and, more likely, more able to accept jobs other than at large
that a more intellectual, graduate school-type approach to law school, that taught students how to
learn on their own, would also produce more skilled practicing attorneys. See White, supra note
117, at 161.
136. E.g., Marin R. Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM.
U. L. REv. 367, 410-16 (1990).
137. Some critics, of course, believe that law schools over emphasize practical skills, at the
expense of further education in theory, doctrine, or the study of law in our society.
138. See D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 219 (comments of Emma Jordan); Talbot
D'Alemberte, Teaching About Justice and Social Contributions, 40 CtEv. ST. L. REv. 363 (1992)
(law schools are failing to prepare students adequately to fight for justice); Edwards, supra note 3,
at 66-74.
139. E.g., D'Alemberte, supra note 114, at 10-11; see also Klare, supra note 99, at 336 ("The
primary function of law schooling is to prepare and to socialize students for entry into a very
narrow range of career lines."); David N. Rockwell, The Education of the Capitalist Lawyer: The
Law School, in LAw AGAINST THE PEoPLE 90 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971); Ralph Nader,
Crumbling of the Old Order: Law Schools and Law Firms, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1969, at 20,
21.
140. Klare, supra note 99, at 336. In today's tight job market, we must further recognize that
not all students will be able to find firms to provide them with adequate training. Unfortunately,
this lack of training will often hurt those students most who entered law school with the worst
writing skills due to less advantaged prior education. The lack of legal training will ultimately
harm consumers of legal services as well.
141. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1250-51.
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firms.142
In sum, most current critics of legal education equate theoretical
education with impractical education.' 4 3 These critics state or imply that
to the extent that theories have any value whatsoever, the value is not to
the practice of law but rather to some other ultimate purpose of legal
education.
B. Attacks on Legal Scholarship
Those persons who have attacked law school teaching as impracti-
cal and inadequate have generally attacked legal scholarship even more
harshly. At a conference, Robert Pitofsky, professor and former dean at
Georgetown University, summarized recent criticisms as a conclusion
that legal scholarship "is increasingly theoretical, impractical, esoteric,
[and] spuriously scientific." '44  He noted the contrast between today's
legal scholarship, in which academics reject the opportunity to influence
real world decisions in order to maintain purity of vision, with the
scholarship of yesteryear, in which scholars sought to play a real world
role. "'45 Critics have also attacked today's legal scholars for their unwill-
ingness to engage in empirical research. 4 '
142. E.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 67-74. See generally Robert L. Bard, Legal Scholarship
and the Professional Responsibility of Law Professors, 16 CONN. L. REv. 731 (1984) (claiming
that the current emphasis on producing a large amount of legal scholarship, not necessarily of high
quality, shortchanges students who would be better served by improved legal education, public
service, and increased emphasis on professional responsibility).
143. In Section IV I will discuss the work of some persons who at least credit the idea that
theoretical legal education can be highly practical. See infra text accompanying notes 196-200.
144. D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 202. The conference was a bench/bar
conference devoted to the nature of legal education. See also Stevens, supra note 14, at 446
("Indeed, to have written the standard practitioner's work in a substantive field of law might well
be the kiss of death for one who wants to be employed in one of our leading law schools.").
Stevens concludes that legal scholars must try to bridge the gap with practice or else risk that
future legal scholarship will take place outside of law schools. Id. at 448.
145. D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 202.
146. E.g., Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323 (1989) (While attacking others for failing to conduct empirical research
that might be grounded in fact and contain testable premises, Schuck admits the same failing in his
own work); see also Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1893-1900 (1988) (advocating that legal scholars more consciously set out
their normative goals and support their assertions through empirical work to better serve
policymakers). Such empirical work might, for example, examine the frequency with which
certain kinds of decisions are made, the dollar amount of awards issued in various jurisdictions, or
the frequency with which certain issues are reversed on appeal. This type of research does not
purport to assert that legal principles themselves may be deduced scientifically.
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Practitioners 4 7 and judges'48 have joined academics' 49 in criticiz-
ing legal scholarship as too ethereal. Many have noted that law review
articles are frequently directed toward an audience consisting of a very
small number of legal academics in the author's own specialty area,
rather than toward an audience of practitioners, judges, or policymak-
ers.150  Studies have revealed that to the extent law review articles are
147. The MacCrate Report summarizes many practitioners' view of legal scholarship:
Practitioners tend to view much academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to
their day-to-day concerns, particularly when compared with the great treatises of an
earlier era. It is not surprising that many practicing lawyers believe law professors
are more interested in pursuing their own intellectual interests than in helping the
legal profession address matters of important current concern.
MacCrate Report, supra note 3, at 5. In a recent speech, Talbot D'Alemberte quotes an excerpt
from John Mortimer's series, Rumpole of the Bailey, which makes a similar point:
An eminent law professor, upon meeting an eminent practitioner, inquires "What do
you think of academic lawyers down at the Old Bailey?" The practitioner replies:
"Well to tell you the truth .... we hardly think of them at all." The Oxford law don
then goes on to inquire: "But you'll have read my paper on 'The Concept of Con-
structive Intent and Mens Rea in Murder and Manslaughter' in The Harvard Law
Review?" "Oh rather," lied the practitioner, "Your average East End jury finds it
absolutely riveting."
D'Alemberte, supra note 114, at 6.
148. Judge Edwards states:
The "impractical" scholar.., produces abstract scholarship that has little relevance
to concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner. As a
consequence, it is my impression that judges, administrators, legislators, and
practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by
members of the academy.
Edwards, supra note 3, at 35.
149. See GLENDON, supra note 4, at 204-05 (bemoaning loss in status of the legal treatise and
voicing suspicion that "many articles will be read by no one at all, other than the writer's
promotion and tenure committee"); Elson, supra note 113; Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against
Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 918 (1986) [hereinafter Farber, The Case Against Brilliance]
(claiming that current scholarly standards place too much emphasis on "brilliance", that is, clever
but highly counterintuitive theories, at the expense of common sense); Daniel A. Farber,
Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987) [hereinafter Farber, Brilliance Revisited]; see
also Alfred S. Konefsky & John H. Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Histories of American
Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833, 848-49 (1982) ("[Llegal scholarship is in many ways a bad
joke."); Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong With the Elite Law Schools, WALL ST. J., June 8,
1993, at A16 (arguing that legal establishment failed adequately to critique the theories of
Professor Lani Guinier, because the legal establishment is disdainful of, and thus out of touch
with, the real world).
150. See Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. LEGAL EDuc. 261, 262
(1990) (asserting that law professors at elite schools write primarily for other elite, and for persons
in other disciplines); John E. Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 317, 321
(1985) ("We do not need to worry about the consumers of law reviews because they really do not
exist. A few professors who author texts must read some of the articles, but most volumes are
purchased to decorate law school library shelves."); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies,
The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. Rv. 131,
135 (1986) (claiming that a growing proportion of academic writing is directed toward scholars
rather than towards the bar or the bench). Compare Stier et al., supra note 35, at 1485, an
empirical survey of Stanford graduates, judges, and professors, which concludes that although
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read at all, they are read primarily by legal academics. Most practition-
ers rarely consult law review articles. 51
The increased emphasis placed on interdisciplinary works, particu-
larly at the most elite law schools, has generated particular criticism. 5 2
Judge Edwards states: "Our law reviews are now full of mediocre inter-
disciplinary articles. Too many law professors are ivory tower dilettan-
tes, pursuing whatever subject piques their interest, whether or not the
subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they have the scholarly
skills to master it.' 15
3
Law schools' current emphasis on scholarship has also been criti-
cized on the ground that time spent on scholarship could be better spent
on teaching. Adherents of this view dispute the frequently argued tenet
that scholarship and teaching are mutually reinforcing.154
The debate that is taking place within legal academia regarding the
attorneys and judges are relatively uninterested in reading law reviews for academic
enlightenment or for theoretical frameworks, they do like to use law reviews on occasion for cites
and new approaches.
151. See James W. Ely, Jr., Through a Crystal Ball: Legal Education-Its Relation to the
Bench, Bar, and University Community, 21 TULSA L.J. 650, 654 (1986) (asserting that law review
articles are largely useless for the busy practitioner); Julius Getman, The Internal Scholarly Jury,
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 337, 339 (1989) (Scholarly movements such as law and economics or feminist
theory limit legal scholars' ability to be self-critical: academics should write so that persons in the
outside world will find their work of some value.).
152. Even some scholars who basically support and encourage interdisciplinary work have
recognized that it can be problematic to the extent it causes legal academia to drift farther apart
from the real world of practitioners. E.g., Francis A. Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status
and Future Prospects, 33 J. Legal Educ. 403, 404 (1983) ("The new [interdisciplinary legal]
scholarship ... threatens a breach ... of the symbiotic relationship, between the schools on the
one hand, and the courts and the profession on the other.... Many in the law schools are speaking
a language incomprehensible to lawyers and judges."); see also Carrington, supra note 24, at 790-
91 (opining that while some interdisciplinary work is desirable, particularly to relieve legal
academia's technocratic impulse, the problem with pure academia is that it is not geared to public
decisionmaking but instead glories in its own irrelevance).
153. Edwards, supra note 3, at 36. Judge Edwards quotes with some disdain a letter written by
a law school academic who viewed himself as if he were in a university religion department, and
who contended that he would not be willing to change his writing to encourage more judges to
read it. Id. In a later article, Professor Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas proudly
admits he is the academic quoted by Judge Edwards, and defends that statement. Sanford
Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment of "Impractical" Scholars: The Need for a Bill of
Particulars, 91 MicH. L. REv. 2010, 2011-12 (1993).
154. See Elson, supra note 113, at 370-71 (asserting that the limited value of scholarship does
not justify the slighting of teaching, which is required); Scordato, supra note 136, at 369-70
(noting that teaching and scholarship are not mutually supportive and arguing that continuing
adherence to dualist model is detrimental to both teaching and scholarship); Dennis J. Turner,
Publish or be Damned, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 550, 552 n.7 (1981) (citing a study purporting to
demonstrate the insignificant relationship between teaching and scholarship). Cf. Paul D.
Carrington, The University Law School and Legal Services, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 402, 409-10
(1978) (claiming the training of future lawyers is well served in an atmosphere where scholarship
is paramount). But see Carrington, supra note 24, at 790 n.250 (criticizing his own "glib
assumption that the academic enterprise necessarily reinforces good teaching").
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proper role and content of legal scholarship must also be examined in
the broader context of liberal arts education in the United States. In
1990 the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching issued
the Boyer Report.' The report argues that "scholarship" has come to
be defined too narrowly, including solely what the report calls the
"scholarship of discovery".15 6 Demonstrating through historical analysis
that the current narrow research-based definition of "scholarship" is a
relatively recent phenomenon arising in the nineteenth century, 57 the
report argues that the definition should now be expanded to include
teaching, integration, and application as on a par with discovery.' 58
"Surely, scholarship means engaging in original research. But the work
of the scholar also means stepping back from one's investigation, look-
ing for connections, building bridges between theory and practice, and
communicating one's knowledge effectively to students."'' 59
In short, while legal teaching and scholarship are currently under
attack from a variety of different perspectives, they are being criticized
most harshly for their lack of contact with, and relevance to, the real
worlds of private practice and public policy. Many of the critics of cur-
rent legal education are most dissatisfied with interdisciplinary and other
abstract theories, which such critics see as having little or no relevance
to practicing attorneys, judges and policymakers.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THEORY
Although, as discussed above, many have attacked the role and use
of legal theory in legal education and scholarship, many have also cham-
pioned legal theory over the years. Praises offered for legal theory par-
allel their authors' views as to the purposes of legal education.' 60 In the
Sections that follow, I will discuss three primary justifications offered
for teaching and writing about legal theory: theory's ability to explain
our world, theory's ability to serve as a source of personal morality and
social justice, and theory's ability to assist real world lawyers in achiev-
155. BOYER, supra note 103.
156. Id. at 15-18.
157. Id. at 7-13.
158. Id. at 75.
159. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). The report explains that with the scholarship of application
"theory and practice vitally interact, and one renews the other." Id. at 23.
160. Compare Frank 1. Michelman, The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean Curricular
Geometry, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 353 (1982) (arguing that legal education has three objectives:
benefitting future clients, society at large, and the students) with Graham Hughes, The Great
American Legal Scholarship Bazaar, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 424, 425 (1983) ("The tug between the
concept of the law school as a graduate academy of political philosophy and the more workaday
view of it as an intensive training ground for the practice of law has always carried the seeds of
the conflict that may now be burgeoning."). See generally Yale Symposium, supra note 3.
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ing their clients' ends.1 61
A. Use of Legal Theory as a Cognitive Tool
Legal theory has often been praised for the predictive, descriptive,
and synthetic assistance it provides in helping us understand our existing
world and legal system. Adherents of this view believe legal theory can
assist us in determining how various cases will turn out, how various
doctrines interrelate, and how legal doctrines and systems interact with
other modes of social organization.
Some who praise legal theory as a cognitive tool view theory essen-
tially as a science. Christopher Columbus Langdell's works perhaps
epitomize this view, drawing an express analogy between the study of
law and the study of physical science.162 However, others whose views
are regarded today as less extreme than Langdell's have also praised
legal theory for the explanatory assistance it provides in the classroom
and in scholarly writings.
While many of the judges and academics who praise the explana-
tory value of legal theory are speaking primarily of doctrinal theory,' 63
the explanatory value of legal theory is also praised by those who advo-
161. Quite clearly one could come up with alternative justifications. It is equally clear that one
may believe that legal theory is legitimated by more than one of these justifications. See, e.g.,
Paul Brest, Plus (7a Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945, 1945 (1993) (While the primary aim of law
school is to train skillful and responsible lawyers, policymakers and judges, legal scholarship
should not only aid these professionals but also serve "the intellectual purpose of expanding legal
knowledge and thought for their own sake."); see also Paul D. Reingold, Harry Edwards'
Nostalgia, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1998, 1998 (1993) (Law schools and legal academic writing serve
the dual purposes of training and assisting practitioners, and providing and describing complex
norms).
162.
[L]aw, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer
... and the shortest and the best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine
effectively is by studying the cases in which it is embodied .... Moreover, the
number of legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed.
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, vii (1871). See
also STEVENS, supra note 58, at 66 (discussing Harvard President Charles Eliot's description of
Langdell's work as akin to a laboratory science, in which the law library was the laboratory).
163. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Legal Realism and Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406,
410 (1983) ("[L]aw faculties have rendered an indispensable service in keeping our law as
coherent and intelligible as it now is."); Kaye, supra note 36, at 319 (Judge, New York Court of
Appeals) (claiming that law reviews can and increasingly should provide valuable doctrinal
analysis rather than focusing on impractical abstract theory such as hermeneutics); Ellen A. Peters,
Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193, 1193 (1981) (then Associate Justice,
Connecticut Supreme Court) ("As a judge on an appellate court.... I look to the writings of
scholars to provide me with broad perspectives, with a sense of past and of future, that busy brief-
writers and harried law clerks cannot often encompass."); Richard A. Posner, The
Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1925-26
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cate more interdisciplinary theoretical work. Such advocates often see
legal theory as a subset of broader humanistic discourse. 164 For exam-
ple, Professor George Priest argued in 1983 that "[i]t is accepted today,
virtually universally, that the legal system can be best understood with
the methods and theories of the social sciences."' 165 Explicitly analogiz-
ing lawyers, and particularly legal academics, to behavioral scientists,
Priest argued that to best understand our legal system, law schools
should cease differentiating themselves from the rest of the university.
"The law-school curriculum will [and should] come to consist of gradu-
ate courses in applied economics, social theory, and political science."'' 66
While by 1993, Priest had somewhat moderated his views, recognizing
that there is a role for doctrine as well as interdisciplinary work within
law schools,167 he still believed that abstract interdisciplinary theory is
necessary to aid in understanding our legal system.' 68
B. Legal Theory as a Source of Justice and Morality
Many look to legal theory as a source of justice or morality. There
are two primary branches of this school of thought. Some advocate
legal training in general, and legal theory in particular, as a means of
making individuals better or more moral people.' 69 Others, relatedly,
(1993) (Judge, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) (praising value of theoretical
doctrinal analysis).
164. See Allen, supra note 152, at 405 (1983) (claiming that many in legal education regard the
primary task of jurisprudence to be the formulation of new intellectual and moral bases for law);
David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and the American Law School, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 109,
113-14 (1989) (discussing how law schools can and should pursue the university ideal of the
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 769 (1987) (praising growth of interdisciplinary
legal analysis as a means of understanding legal system); Priest, supra note 12, at 441 (predicting
approvingly that law schools will become like graduate schools in social science); Mark Tushnet,
Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L. Rv. 1205, 1206 (1981) (wishing legal
scholars would address the central issue of our century: the conflict between subjectivity and
objectivity). But see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 155 (1918)
(arguing that law school does not belong in the university); Collier, supra note 89, at 271 (arguing
that given the radically different structure of authority in law, by comparison to the humanities,
the hope that humanistic theory will be able to provide a source of intellectual authority for law is
largely vain); Wellington, supra note 7, at 5 ("A law school cannot be a little faculty of arts and
sciences.").
165. Priest, supra note 12, at 437.
166. Id. at 441.
167. Priest, supra note 32, at 1936.
168. Id. Cf. Rand E. Rosenblatt, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 1153
passim (1970) (claiming that because major theoretical questions have not yet been answered, law
schools, if serious about intellectual engagement with social problems, will, like the social
sciences find themselves drawn into a large theoretical crisis).
169. The individuals to be "bettered" may include not only students but also other readers and
perhaps even authors of legal theory.
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believe legal theory can effectively be used to critique our society and
system of government.
Historically, many persons believed legal training should be geared
primarily to turning law students into better persons: into leaders of
society.17 0  Professor Paul Carrington, for example, argues that in the
first century of American legal education, because leaders' status
derived from their morality and fitness to lead, rather than from their
royal blood, a line was seldom clearly drawn between professional train-
ing and general education.17  Others have urged that legal scholarship
today does, and to a greater extent should, help individuals become more
moral and better people. 72
Many see legal theory not so much as a source of individual moral-
ity but rather as a basis, at least potentially, upon which to critique or
serve society at large. For example, Professor Charles R. Lawrence, III
argues that law school teaching and theoretical scholarship can and
should fit into the tradition of "the Word," an African-American "tradi-
tion of teaching, preaching, and healing ....,,7 Arguing that scholar-
ship must strive to be both pragmatic and utopian, Professor Lawrence
170. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67.
171. Carrington, supra note 24, at 756-57, 802-03. Professor Carrington assesses the possible
role of law school teaching as a foundation of restrained democratic government. Discussing a
variety of factors that he believes have taken legal education away from a focus on public morality
and public affairs, Carrington concludes that more emphasis should be placed on scholarship with
relevance to real world problems. Id. at 802-03. See also ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 123-26 (1835) (Mentor ed., 1986) ("In America, there are no nobles or literary men,
and the people are apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political
class, and the most cultivated portion of society.").
172. E.g., D'Alemberte, supra note 138, at 370 (arguing that law schools should revive the
Jeffersonian model of legal education as moral education, which encourages lawyers to pursue
their own justice mission); Terrance Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 163, 166-68 (1984) (claiming part of the responsibility of law schools is to instill
moral character in students); see also D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 215-20 (comments
of Dean Emma Jordan) (identifying a need for more moral education); Bryant G. Garth, Legal
Education and Large Law Firms: Delivering Legality or Solving Problems, 64 IND. L.J. 433, 445
(1989) (arguing that law schools should teach future lawyers to be guided by morality); Anthony
T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 955 (1981)
(asserting that legal scholarship plays an important role in the process of moral education that is
indispensable to law students' training).
173. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle,
65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2238 (1992). Lawrence further describes "the Word" as "an
interdisciplinary tradition wherein healers are concerned with the soul and preachers with the
pedagogy of the oppressed ... an articulation and validation of our common experience ... a
practice of raising questions about reasons for oppression." Id. See generally HOOKS, supra note
45; WIL.IAMS, supra note 47. Cf. Carrington, supra note 24, at 802 (claiming that the unwelcome
reality for legal academics is that they are often forced to choose between work that can be applied
usefully to public affairs and work that is more intellectually ambitious and likely to win academic
recognition).
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explains that legal theory can help heal and reform society.' 7 4 Professor
Edward Rubin asserts that when legal scholars properly set out the nor-
mative justifications for their work, especially if supported by empirical
analysis, they can provide a real service for policymakers.175 Professors
Derrick Bell and Emma Jordan have also argued that specific theories,
such as critical race theory, are valuable because they offer a pragmatic
means to critique our social structures.176  Some practitioners even
praise abstract legal theory for the support it may provide in critiquing
the existing establishment. 77
C. Legal Theory as a Tool for Practitioners
Finally, some purport to praise legal theory not only for its human-
istic insights or moral value, but also for the nuts-and-bolts assistance it
may provide to legal practitioners. Most who praise legal theory for its
practical assistance praise the most doctrinal aspects of legal theory. 78
While such doctrinal theory, of course, will have value for practicing
attorneys, judges, and legislators, 79 its utility is well-accepted and is not
the subject of this Article.
By contrast, very few legal academics or practitioners purport to
value nondoctrinal theory for the practical assistance it may provide.
174. Lawrence, supra note 173, at 2239; see John E. Cribbet, The Changeless, Ever-Changing
University: The Role of the Law School, 26 ARiz. L. REv. 241, 250-51 (1984) (maintaining that
law schools should not only prepare students to pass the bar but should also serve the needs of
society).
175. Rubin, supra note 146, at 1900.
176. D.C. Circuit Conference, supra note 3, at 216 (comments of Emma Jordan) ("[T]he newly
emerging genre of critical race legal theory and feminist legal theory offer [sic] a window of
intellectual opportunity, through which lawyers can begin to reimagine a just and fair society.");
Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV.
2025, 2052 (1993) (arguing that alternative visions offered by critical race theorists and others
doing "law and" work may offer our only hope of making the legal profession honorable).
177. E.g., Gordon, supra note 21, at 1961-62. As a large firm partner Gordon contends that it
is the work of "outsider" theoretical scholars, such as feminists and critical race theorists, which
are most helpful to her as a practitioner, in that the heavily doctrinal education, praised by some,
essentially promotes the existing establishment, whereas the outsider scholarship can be used to
critique the establishment. Id.
178. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 163, at 777 ("Disinterested legal-doctrinal analysis of the
traditional kind remains the indispensable core of legal thought . . ."); Charles B. Nutting,
Training Lawyers for the Future, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4 (1953) (arguing that the most practical
education possible is the most theoretical, because mental analysis is the most important skill for
the student); Kaye, supra note 36, at 316 (claiming that law reviews can be valuable for doctrinal
as opposed to abstract analysis).
179. Doctrine assists practitioners by seeking to find common threads among seemingly
disparate cases or groups of cases, or by critiquing a holding or proposed holding as inconsistent
with precedent. Doctrinal analysis taught in law school is also praised for training future lawyers
how to think and how to argue. See McGowan, supra note 112, at 378 (maintaining that law
schools are solely responsible for providing the theoretical training only they can provide, in order
to help students think like lawyers).
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Occasionally, both practitioners and academics have praised seemingly
ethereal and impractical theories such as law and economics, feminist
theory, or critical race theory for their value.' Yet, while some have
abstractly asserted that nondoctrinal theories may have practical value,
most have failed to support their argument with specifics. Nor have
such advocates demanded that abstract theories be connected to practical
solutions or presented so as to allow legal practitioners to easily incorpo-
rate the theory into their work.' 8 '
In sum, defenders of abstract theory generally do not cite its practi-
cal contributions to the everyday work of practicing attorneys, judges,
and policymakers, but rather defend it on other moral or educational
grounds. Further, even those few persons who do praise abstract theory
for its practical value often lavish that praise too easily. They usually do
so without actually developing the connection to practice nor spelling
out the consequences of a true link between the worlds of abstract theory
and the practice of law.
V. THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE:
ADVOCATING A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS
In contrast to the vast majority of practitioners and academics dis-
cussed above, I believe that highly abstract legal theories do, and to a
greater extent can, prove very helpful to legal practitioners in their daily
work. For example, the critical legal studies approach, scorned by many
as anti-doctrinal and thus useless for the actual practice of law,' 8 2 can
provide great assistance in conceptualizing approaches and drafting
briefs on real legal problems.'83 The law and economics school, criti-
cized by many as a mere attempt to analyze decisions through a highly
unrealistic and politically conservative lens, 84 has and can provide liti-
gators, transactional attorneys, and policymakers with valuable analytic
180. See Bell & Edmonds, supra note 176, at 2036-37 (praising practical value of feminist and
critical race theory); Gordon, supra note 21, at 1961 (praising practical value of "outsider"
theories for practitioners); Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91
MICH. L. REV. 2075, 2095 (1993) (claiming that the various "law and" theories may provide
valuable skills training); Posner, supra note 163, at 1925-26 (discussing contributions of law and
economics theory to antitrust, deregulation, family law, and employment law); James B. White,
Law Teachers' Writing, 91 MIcH L. REV. 1970, 1970 (1993) ("It is often the most theoretical
work that will prove of surprising practical value .... ").
181. There is, however, a body of feminist theory that attempts to link abstract theory to
practice issues. See infra notes 270, 283-87 and accompanying text.
182. E.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 47.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 212-54.
184. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:707
tools. 8 5  Feminist theory, seen by some as largely irrelevant sermon-
izing ramblings, can provide litigators and policy makers with fresh
ways of formulating arguments and solving problems.18 6
In Section IV(A) I will discuss what I view as the ideal relationship
between theory and practice in legal education and practice. I call this
ideal relationship "symbiotic" because, although I see theory and prac-
tice as conceptually distinct, I believe that both theory and practice can
be strengthened by their relationship with one another. 87
In Section IV(B) I will use a hypothetical to establish that even the
most abstract legal theories can in fact have real practical value. Finally,
in Section IV(C), I will discuss the implications of my thesis for both
legal academics and legal practitioners. Specifically, I will argue that
abstract legal theories can only prove valuable to practitioners if aca-
demics work to establish a jurisprudence of practical applications.
A. All Legal Theories Should Be Designed and Presented to Have
Practical Value
Most agree that the primary purpose of law school is to train future
lawyers.' 88 While some academics may protest the "trade school"
label, 89 and many may argue that law schools serve valid purposes in
addition to training lawyers, 90 few could actually deny, if pressed, that
law schools exist primarily to prepare lawyers for practice.' '
185. See infra text accompanying notes 255-67.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 270-316. See generally Schneider, supra note 18.
187. See generally Cramton, supra note 113, at 331 ("Theory and practice are not opposed but
illuminate and inform each other."); Gordon, supra note 180, at 2096 ("I will not try to make an
extended case for the practical value of theory. The whole 'theory-practice' distinction strikes me
as unutterably daffy. The point of theory is to clarify and inform practice: if it does not, it is just
bad theory."); White, supra note 180, at 1970 ("The opposition between 'theoretical' and
'practical' is, I think, misleading. It is ... often the immersion in practical particularities that will
stimulate the most valuable thought of a general kind."). Professor Blasi has applied a similar
argument to that pariah of many theorists, clinical education, showing that cognitive psychological
theories can help us provide future attorneys with necessary legal skills. Blasi, supra note 18.
188. See Brest, supra note 161, at 1945; Elson, supra note 113, at 344: Johnson, supra note 7,
at 1235. The history of American legal education also demonstrates that over the course of the
last two centuries, law schools have been devoted primarily to training attorneys. See supra text
accompanying notes 58-107.
189. See, e.g., MacCrate Report, supra note 3, at 4 ("Law schools offer the traditional
responses: 'We teach them how to think, we're not trade schools, we're centers of scholarship
and learning, practice is best taught by practitioners.' "); Johnson, supra note 7, at 1254
(discussing legal academy's repudiation of "the training function").
190. See supra text accompanying notes 160-177.
191. My own institution, Florida State University College of Law, has adopted a mission
statement providing that "[t]he Chief purpose of our research and instruction is to gain
understanding of the role of legal concepts and values." While this mission certainly does not
oppose training students to be practitioners, the wording of the statement illustrates legal
academics' discomfort with espousing training of lawyers as their primary function.
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Similarly, law reviews ought to have some value to those who prac-
tice law, whether as litigators, corporate attorneys, judges, or legislators.
Although it may be appropriate for law reviews to publish some articles
appealing solely to legal educators, certainly, law reviews ought also
serve the needs of those engaged in the practice of law. Practitioners,
including judges and legislators, do not have as much time as academics
to reflect broadly on implications going beyond their particular case or
on interactions between a variety of legal doctrines and theories. 192
Thus, it seems eminently sensible that legal scholars ought to help meet
this need. 93
The idea that legal theory and legal practice should be integrated is
not new. Oliver Wendell Holmes, in 1897, urged that legal theory must
be derived from practice, and that legal theory should play an important
role in practice, stating:
[Law is not] a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms
or what not .... [but rather] prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact .... We have too little theory in the law rather than too much
.... Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law ....
The danger is that the able and practical minded should look with
indifference or distrust upon ideas the connection of which with their
business is remote.' 94
By the 1930s, Legal Realists such as Jerome Frank were more concerned
that legal practice was being underemphasized in legal education than
that theory was being omitted. Frank advocated hiring more professors
with practical experience and sought the establishment of clinical pro-
grams.' 95 Yet, the Legal Realists did not attempt to evict theory from
the law schools and in fact praised abstract theory as a counter to
Langdellian formalism.
Modern commentators often urge that legal theory and legal prac-
192. Although some academics criticize practitioners as lazy, petty, or nonintellectual for
failing to use abstract theory in their work, I believe practitioners simply cannot afford to spend
their limited time on deciphering and applying abstract theory. With more help from academia
they might use abstract theory more often.
193. Admittedly practitioners must and do contemplate how a rule in one case may be praised
or criticized in view of its effect on other cases. After all, this analysis supports the familiar
"slippery slope" argument. Nonetheless, academics have the opportunity to engage in more wide-
ranging analysis, unconstrained by an immediate need to bill their time to a particular case. See
Edwards, supra note 3, at 65-66 (claiming that ideally law school teachers and scholars would
bridge the gap between theory and practice by integrating theory with doctrine in order to solve
difficult legal problems); Gee & Jackson, supra note 58, at 962 (urging that professors should
strive to demonstrate the practical value of theoretical insights).
194. Holmes, supra note 20, at 460-61, 476-78.
195. Frank, supra note 69, at 917-20; Jerome Frank, A Plea For Lawyer-Schools, 56 YAaE L.J.
1303, 1313-16 (1947).
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tice should be integrated. 196  For example, Gordon Gee and Donald
Jackson stated in 1977: "A defense by traditional legal educators of
theoretical training misses the mark if it only defends an isolated theo-
retical approach to law. The solution-and the problem-is to make
theory and other non-bread-and-butter knowledge useful."' 197 The gen-
eral principle that theory and practice ought to be integrated seems fairly
non-controversial.
However, as discussed above, even a person who accepts the gen-
eral principle that some theory is relevant to practice may still dispute
the notion that the most abstract theories are or can be relevant to practi-
tioners. For example, Judge Edwards and many others believe doctrinal
theory is useful, but doubt the practical value of critical legal studies or
other more abstract theories. 198
Moving beyond the well-accepted principle that doctrinal theories
are useful to practice, my main point is that certain abstract theories
have practical value. Others have made this argument in limited ways.
For example, Richard Posner and others have praised the practical con-
tributions of law and economics.1 99 Ruth Colker, Derrick Bell, and
others have praised the practical value of feminist and critical race theo-
ries." Yet few of these scholars have actually taken on the task of
196. See Cramton, supra note 113, at 331 (positing that theory and practice support each
other); Eric S. Janus, Clinics and "Contextual Integration ": Helping Law Students Put the Pieces
Back Together Again, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 463, 463 (1990) (stating that clinical education
is desirable because it links theory, practice and values); Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers
Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 57 (1992) (claiming that the true goal of legal education
should be to teach students to think like lawyers by integrating theory and practice).
197. Gee & Jackson, supra note 58, at 962.
198. E.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 47.
199. Posner, supra note 163, at 1925-26 (discussing contributions of law and economics
school to fields of antitrust, deregulation, family law, and employment law); see also Tapes of
Workshop on the Transactional Approach to Law, supra note 118 (arguing that law and
economics and other approaches are useful in practice and should be made accessible to students
through problem-oriented pedagogy); Wellington, supra note 7 (noting that much useful work by
law and economics scholars has been absorbed by practitioners). But cf. Harry H. Wellington,
Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 327
(1987) (contending that much useful legal academic theory has less impact than it should, in part
because too few academics are doing applied work).
200. COLKER, supra note 18 (attempting to develop a feminist jurisprudence that works in
practice as well as in theory); Bell & Edmonds, supra note 176, at 2033-36; Fineman, supra note
18, at 25 (claiming that feminist scholars should seek to fill the gap between "grand theory,"
which is too general and abstract to be useful, and personal narratives, which are too specific);
Schneider, supra note 18 (discussing importance of linking feminist theory with practice); see also
Gordon, supra note 21, at 1961-62 (arguing that "outsider" theorists, including feminists and
critical race theorists, actually offer more realistic insights than do traditional scholars); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41, 44 (1987)
(emphasizing the need for a strong link between theory and practice in the teaching of civil
procedure).
[Vol. 50:707
1996] SYMBIOTIC LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL PRACTICE 745
demonstrating the utility of abstract theory to practitioners. 20 1 Nor have
they applied their insights to a theory of legal education. In an attempt
to do so this Article expands and develops the work of these scholars.
B. A Demonstration that Abstract Legal Theory Can Have
Practical Value
In this Section, I use a hypothetical to demonstrate that seemingly
abstract theories can in fact be relevant to the practice of law. Specifi-
cally, I attempt to package some of the insights provided by advocates of
critical legal studies, law and economics, and feminist jurisprudence.
My goal is to help policymakers and legal advocates more effectively
address the question analyzed in my own most recent article: whether
newborn children should be subjected to mandatory non-anonymous
testing for HIV (the virus that causes AIDS).2"2
In typical law professor style, I will pose two hypothetical scena-
rios. First, I will discuss insights provided by the three abstract theories
to a hypothetical lobbyist opposed to a mandatory testing law. I will
also discuss insights provided by the theories to a hypothetical plain-
tiff's attorney representing a mother opposed to imaginary mandatory
testing legislation. One could, alternatively, use each of these theories to
assist a lobbyist and litigator who favored testing. For simplicity, I have
selected one set of possible practical uses to explicate my points, and
occasionally mention the counter arguments in footnotes.20 3
As I commence this discussion, I offer a disclaimer. Critical legal
studies, law and economics, and feminist theory are all tremendously
rich and complicated bodies of work. Each of these fields could offer
many insights into the above hypotheticals; moreover, theorists within a
given area would likely disagree even among themselves as to what
insights are best derived from the field. My goal is not to single-
handedly develop an applied jurisprudence with respect to each of these
disciplines. Indeed, each analysis could itself be the subject of an entire
article. Nor is my goal here to convince readers that mandatory testing
of newborn for HIV is inadvisable or unconstitutional. Rather, my much
more modest ambition is to demonstrate that abstract theories can have
practical value. I thereby hope to inspire other academics and practition-
201. While some might argue their theory is so clearly relevant as to render this demonstration
unnecessary, the continuing discomfort with abstract theory requires theoreticians to defend their
work.
202. Stemlight, supra note 28.
203. In either case, I do not pretend that the arguments generated by the three theories are all
compelling. Indeed, I do not believe that the theories alone can be convincing, absent factual or
empirical support. Instead, the value of the theories is that they offer insights which, if supported
by evidence or found inherently believable, may be compelling.
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ers to utilize abstract disciplines for practical assistance and to develop
these linkages.
1. SETTING UP THE HYPOTHETICAL
In the interest of brevity, and because the detail is not necessary, I
will not provide the specifics of the mandatory testing legislation. In
essence it would simply require that each child born in any public or
private facility in the imaginary State of Nirvana be tested for HIV, with
or without the consent of either the child or the parent.2°4 The statute
would require all Nirvana medical facilities involved in the birthing pro-
cess to ensure that the testing be accomplished, and would subject any
violators to strict penalties. All of the plaintiff-side lawyers opposing
the statute will use their respective policy arguments to argue that the
statute is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution because it violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable search and seizures, 20 5 the right to privacy, and/or the
equal protection clause. Essentially, both the privacy and due process
arguments ultimately require the court to weigh the government's inter-
est in testing against the mother's and child's interest in avoiding the
test.206
My hypothetical poses the question of whether newborn children
may or should be tested for the HIV virus on a non-anonymous basis
without their parents' consent. As I have discussed elsewhere, many
persons concerned with public health have proposed such mandatory
testing in order to provide better medical care to those newborns
revealed to be HIV infected.20 7 Opponents of the testing argue that it is
unnecessary and unduly invasive of mothers' and children's privacy
interests, particularly given the facts that: (1) identifying a newborn as
HIV infected also identifies the mother as such;2 8 (2) under existing
tests only approximately one third of the newborns who test positive at
birth are actually HIV infected, because two thirds of the newborns who
test positive are instead merely carrying maternal antibodies that will
disappear after about a year;209 (3) no cure for the virus currently
exists;210 and (4) revealing mother and child to be HIV infected may
204. Obviously, a newborn child could not provide her own knowing consent.
205. The Fourth Amendment has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause. Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1949). See generally Sternlight, supra
note 28, at 379-81.
206. Sternlight, supra note 28, at 380.
207. Id. at 381. See also Linda F. Post, Unblinded Mandatory HIV Screening of Newborns:
Care or Coercion?, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 169, 172 (1994).
208. Sternlight, supra note 28, at 376-77.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 377.
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place them and their family at great risk of discrimination.2 t'
2. CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
a. Discussion of the Theory
As I commence this discussion I must renew my earlier caveat. It
would be impossible for me to do justice to the breadth and complexity
of critical legal studies ("CLS") in this brief analysis. As one (some-
what frustrated) editor noted:
A really representative book on critical legal studies would include
examples of socialist, structuralist, deconstructionist, feminist, phe-
nomenological and Hegelian critical legal theory-as well as four or
five other approaches. It would explore a number of CLS analyses of
race, gender and class, and give ample room to the thoughtful criti-
cisms which have been made of them. It would also be longer than
the Encyclopaedia Britannica.2 12
Thus, instead of attempting to summarize that which cannot be summa-
rized briefly, I will focus on two strands of CLS work that I find particu-
larly useful for the problem at hand.2"3
Critical legal studies, in many senses a successor to the Legal Real-
ism of the 1930s and 1940s, 2"4 is based on the premise that subjective
value choices and policy choices are inherent in the law. Thus, much
CLS work is devoted to the project of "deconstructing" others' analyses
that purport to derive the legal or "right" answer from certain words or
legal principles that purport to be objective.
211. Id. at 383.
212. James Boyle, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES xiii (James Boyle ed., 1992)
(footnotes omitted). For a more complete discussion of CLS, I refer readers not only to Boyle,
supra, but also to such collections and bibliographies as MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed.,
1982); A Symposium of Critical Legal Studies, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 929 (1985); Duncan Kennedy &
Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984); and
Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1984); see also ANDREW
ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
213. Although some might argue that I am cheating by focusing on those strands of CLS most
useful to prove my point, I believe this selection is both necessary and justifiable. It is necessary
because I could not possibly discuss all aspects of the wide-ranging theory. It is justifiable
because I have never asserted that all abstract theories have practical value but only that some do
and more can. Thus, even if my selection is biased in favor of those abstract theories with
practical value, I will have proved my point.
214. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1936); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW]; KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Roscoe
Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
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Duncan Kennedy's pioneering work, Form and Substance in Pri-
vate Law Adjudication,215 is still one of the best examples of the CLS
deconstructionist approach.21 6 In that article, Kennedy explores "the
nature and interconnection of the different rhetorical modes found in
American private law opinions, articles and treatises. 21 7 He concludes
that just as two rhetorical modes of "individualism" and "altruism"
oppose one another in debates on substantive issues, a mode of clearly
defined highly administrable rules opposes a mode of equitable ad hoc
decisions in debates on form.21 8 Kennedy then goes on to argue that
these substantive and formal debates are related to one another.
"[A]ltruistic views on substantive private law issues lead to willingness
to resort to standards in administration, while individualism seems to
harmonize with an insistence on rigid rules rigidly applied. 219
Kennedy's second and most important conclusion is that neither
substantive nor formal conflict in the law can be reduced to a neutral
calculus or right answer. Rather, legal debates inevitably reflect the
underlying conflict and fundamental contradictions between individual-
ism and altruism-"irreconcilable visions of humanity and society, and
... radically different aspirations for our common future. '220 Kennedy
sees the rhetorical constructs of "altruism" and "individualism" as
neither verifiable empirical assertions nor logically pure models, but
rather as useful, recognizable stereotypical rhetorical modes.22'
The opposition between the altruistic and individualistic forms of
argument cannot produce a single right answer because for each "pro"
argument from within the altruistic mode there is an equivalent "con"
argument from within the individualistic mode. Citing to Karl Llewel-
lyn's "famous set of contradictory 'canons on statutes,' "222 Kennedy
explains that "for each pro argument there is a con twin. '223 As Ken-
nedy readily admits, "[t]here is nothing innovative" 224 about his effort to
break down the position that "legal argument is autonomous from moral,
215. 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
216. Other examples include: Kenneth M. Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks:
Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 765 (1985); Clare
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Duncan
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 209 (1979); Mark
Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers, 36 BuFF. L. REV. 217 (1987).
217. Kennedy, supra note 215, at 1685.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1722-23.
222. Id. at 1723 (citing LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW, supra note 214, at 521-35).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1724.
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economic, and political discourse in general. 225 Rather, his unique con-
tribution is his "attempt to show an orderliness to the debates about 'pol-
icy' with which we are left after abandonment of the claim of
neutrality. 226
Specifically, the orderliness consists of the fact that each "pro" or
''con" can be identified with a larger rhetorical mode on any given point.
For example, Kennedy shows that the individualist moral ethic of self-
reliance consistently comes up against the altruistic ethic of sacrifice and
sharing.227 The individualistic economic rhetoric of achieving the maxi-
mum public welfare through nonintervention consistently competes with
the altruistic ethos of achieving equity through adjudication and
intervention.228
In a subsequent work, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology,229 Professor Kennedy spells out his theory of
legal reasoning in a different context.2 30 Focusing on the reasoning pro-
cess of a hypothetical judge who perceives "a conflict between 'the law'
and 'how-I-want-to-come-out,' 23 1 Kennedy portrays the judge as men-
tally canvassing a series of options: changing the rule, limiting the rule
with a countervailing alternative rule, or using policy arguments to rein-
terpret the rule. Here, in discussing potential policy arguments, Ken-
nedy explains:
The arguer can pick and choose from a truly enormous repertoire of
typical policy arguments and modify what he finds to fit the case at
hand. The arguments come in matched contrary pairs, like certainty
vs. flexibility, security vs. freedom of action, property as incentive to
labor vs. property as incipient monopoly, no liability without fault vs.
as between two innocents he who caused the damage should pay, the
supremacy clause v. local initiative, and so on.232
As Kennedy recognizes, much of his analysis would be as helpful to
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1751.
228. Id.
229. 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
230. In another work, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 216, Kennedy
does a careful textual analysis of Blackstone's 18th century Commentaries on the Laws of
England. Kennedy, again focuses on the use of "rhetoric" in law. He attempts to show that the
law, which Blackstone sought to portray as systematic and thematically coherent, is instead a
battleground of conflicting principles. Blackstone's attempt at systematization is ultimately
dependent on categorizations such as the "public/private" distinction, which categorizations
Kennedy argues are, themselves, suspect. Id. at 215. In the end, asserts Kennedy, the various
legal decisions all come down to a conflict between collective and individual self-determination.
Id. at 211-13.
231. Kennedy, supra note 229, at 518.
232. Id. at 534.
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potential advocates as to judges.233
I believe, and will endeavor to show, that Professor Kennedy's the-
oretical framework, once made intellectually accessible to the average
attorney, can provide substantial assistance to the practitioner. In fact,
Professor James Boyle, in The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 has laid
much of the framework for my enterprise by writing an excellent article
demonstrating how the deconstructionist CLS approach can be used to
teach a first year torts class.235 Boyle explains to his students:
There are three main techniques which you need to learn if you want
to argue about rules or past decisions. The first is the technique of
making both purposive and formalist arguments about the meaning of
words or rules. The second is the technique of generating both broad
and narrow rules from the same case. The third is the general tech-
nique of factual and legal manipulation. All three techniques can be
learned and, with a little practice, applied to almost any legal
dispute.236
Boyle distinguishes this approach from the nonprecedential
approach of making policy arguments. Here, like Duncan Kennedy, he
likens the policy arguments to mere pairs of cliches-always juxtaposed
and loaded with normative implications.2 " He breaks the policy argu-
ments into five categories: arguments about "formal realizability" or
"judicial administration" (firm rule v. flexible standard); arguments
about "institutional competence" (whether courts are or are not the right
body to resolve the dispute); "moral arguments" (e.g. freedom v. secur-
ity or morality as form, such as keeping bargains, v. morality as substan-
tive fairness); "social utility/deterrence arguments"2 38 (flexibility v.
stability as the best mode of encouraging productivity); and "economic
arguments" (assumptions of perfect competition v. obvious market
imperfections such as transaction costs, social costs, irrationality, etc.).
233. Id. at 518, 522.
234. Boyle, supra note 18. Boyle expresses gratitude to Duncan Kennedy for both inspiring
the article and also providing Boyle with his torts teaching materials. Id. at 1003, 1015 n.14.
235. It is not coincidental that Boyle, who has written one of the few articles applying abstract
theory to practical problems, shares many of my views about legal scholarship and teaching. He
observes that "if there is one issue on which there is general consensus among law teachers, it is
that legal education is even sicker than legal scholarship. First year angst, second and third year
burnout, not enough theory, not enough practical skills . I..." ld. at 1005. Like me, Boyle seeks
to blend abstract theory with practical advocacy, complaining that "almost nobody writes about
the peculiar fusion of abstract theoretical aims ... and concrete classroom experiences . I..." Id.
at 1003.
236. Id. at 1052.
237. Id. at 1056-60. While admitting that the use of categories "is a bad idea," Boyle
nonetheless asserts that they serve a valuable purpose. Id. at 1056.
238. Boyle admits that these "tend to intersect with moral and economic arguments." Id. at
1058.
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Boyle goes on to provide an example of how to use these various argu-
ments to take a position in favor of or against creation of a legally pro-
tected interest in freedom from malicious and unfair competition. I will
attempt to show how Kennedy's and Boyle's approach can be
immensely useful to practicing attorneys, judges, and policymakers, as
well as to law students.
A second aspect of CLS scholarship also examines law as part of a
much broader social and political movement, but focuses particularly on
the role of the lawyer or law professor given the ultimate connection
between law and politics. For example, Peter Gabel and Paul Harris, in
an article entitled Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law,239 discuss how a CLS lawyer should
not only make legal arguments in court but should also focus on com-
munity and client empowerment, public relations, and political activ-
ism.24 Discussing particular cases, including the trial of the Chicago
Eight,2  Gabel and Harris provide specific suggestions for how the
attorney should politicize her cases.242 The authors further argue that
seemingly non-political cases can and should be dealt with using broader
political strategies as well. 3
b. Insights for Lobbyist Opposing Legislation
The deconstructionist focus on law as rhetoric provides the lobbyist
with a tool kit of possible types of policy arguments. Specifically, the
lobbyist opposed to mandatory testing of newborns for HIV may look to
the array of policy arguments discussed by Professors Duncan Kennedy,
James Boyle, and others for assistance in developing her opposition to
such testing.2'
As outlined above, Professors Kennedy and Boyle set out five
major categories of policy arguments that can generally (or perhaps
always) be used on any given point: formal realizability; institutional
competence; morality; deterrence or social utility; and economics. The
lobbyist opposed to mandatory testing of newborns for HIV may use this
239. 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-1983).
240. Id. See also Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting
Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337 (1978); Comment, The
New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1087-88 (1970) (advocating political
organization in conjunction with traditional legal defense).
241. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973).
242. Gabel & Harris, supra note 239, at 380-81.
243. Id. at 389-94 (illustrating how seemingly nonpolitical cases often contain politically
charged issues which, if identified and tied to interest groups, can bring about social change).
244. See Boyle, supra note 18, at 1056-63; Kennedy, supra note 215; Kennedy, supra note
229.
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categorization of arguments to develop more policy arguments than may
initially have sprung to mind.
First, in terms of formal realizability the lobbyist may argue that it
is unfair, harsh, and overly rigid to force women to be tested (through
mandatory testing of newborns) but not to force testing on fathers or,
indeed, on any other members of society. That is, the lobbyist could
argue that the mandatory testing of all newborns is both overly inclusive
and underinclusive. It is overinclusive in that statistically many
newborns, depending on their socio-economic background, are at essen-
tially no risk of testing positive for HIV. It is underinclusive in that
many other members of society are at much higher risk of testing posi-
tive than is the typical newborn. If the purpose of the mandatory testing
is to reduce the spread of AIDS, society should only mandate testing, if
ever, in situations where the testing is warranted by the specific circum-
stances. The lobbyist could also employ another favorite adminis-
trability technique-the "slippery slope" argument. Today the
government proposes mandatory testing of newborns for HIV. What
might the government try tomorrow? Mandatory testing of all persons?
Mandatory testing of newborns for all possible diseases? Mandatory
testing of newborns (or all persons) for all possible genetic
proclivities?24 5
Second, in terms of institutional competence, the lobbyist can argue
that mandatory medical testing should not appropriately be imposed by a
state legislature. The lobbyist could argue that medical decisions, by
their nature, are personal and fact specific, and should be left to the
discretion of the patients and appropriate medical personnel, not legis-
lated by a state. The lobbyist could further argue that if any legislative
body were to impose the testing it should be the federal rather than a
state government. Since, people and diseases can easily cross state lines,
a state-by-state rule makes little sense.246
Third, as a matter of morality the lobbyist may argue that it is
wrong to punish (through forced testing) a woman who may have done
nothing inappropriate or immoral. Even if the woman ultimately tests
positive it may be because she was duped into having sexual relations
with a man who was HIV positive. Further, the lobbyist may argue a
woman has a moral right, as a matter of privacy and personal control, to
245. The lobbyist favoring testing could make a formal realizability argument saying it is far
easier, cheaper, and less invasive of privacy to test all newborns for HIV, rather than to attempt to
impose tests merely in certain situations, or to convince parents of the need to have their children
tested.
246. Equally, the lobbyist favoring testing could argue that a legislature, representing the
majority's views, is precisely the best body to protect societal interests.
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determine whether, when, and to what extent her HIV status should be
revealed.
Fourth, as a matter of deterrence and social utility the lobbyist may
argue that the mandatory testing will deter numerous women from
obtaining prenatal care and thus prove counterproductive in terms of
AIDS education and prevention. Women who fear testing, often those
most likely to test positive, may either avoid prenatal care altogether or
obtain such care from a state that does not mandate testing of pregnant
women. 4 7 Ultimately, the mandatory testing rule could, therefore,
prove counterproductive by discouraging mothers from obtaining the
prenatal care that could inform them as to the risks of HIV transmission
and allow them to be tested on a voluntary basis.
Fifth and finally, in terms of economics, the lobbyist may argue that
given the relatively low incidence of HIV, the cost of mandatory testing
will far exceed the value of early detection. The lobbyist may further
argue that dollars spent on mandatory testing could be better spent on
education. Most generally, the lobbyist may argue that because mothers
can be assumed to be rational people who love and value their children,
there is no need to force them to be tested. Rather, such governmental
interference is likely to create a market inefficiency.
Of course, one need not be a disciple of CLS to come up with these
policy arguments. No doubt many good lawyers who have no knowl-
edge or understanding of CLS could come up with many or even all of
these arguments. Further, as presented, the arguments are somewhat
superficial. To be powerful they would require some empirical or anec-
dotal substantiation. Nonetheless, the CLS approach to law is very valu-
able to the lobbyist in that by revealing the inevitably indeterminate
nature of our system of law it empowers advocates to make arguments
they might otherwise fail to see. Further, the CLS method provides an
organized method that assists the advocate in quickly generating a series
of policy arguments. Having identified the arguments to be made, the
lobbyist can then collect more data to support the points. Although the
lobbyist may be able to generate the arguments without the CLS
method, CLS makes the task quicker and easier.
c. Insights for Plaintiff's Attorney Opposing Legislation
The plaintiff's attorney opposed to mandatory testing legislation
247. That is, those women who are in a high risk group, for example, because they use drugs or
are partners of drug users, are the ones who may well shy away from procedures likely to subject
them to mandatory testing. In making this assertion one need not presume that women in high
risk groups care less about their children, but only that they respond rationally to the risks of
discrimination and breach of confidentiality. See generally Sternlight, supra note 28, at 383.
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may use the deconstructionist strand of CLS theory to help her generate
the kinds of policy arguments already addressed above with respect to
the lobbyist. The plaintiff's attorney may then work these policy argu-
ments into her brief by making them part of her due process thesis that
the legislation undercuts the mother's rights and does not serve a com-
pelling government interest or meet a special need. 4 8 That is, the plain-
tiff's attorney can use the policy arguments to help her show that upon
balancing the woman's privacy interests against the government's inter-
est in testing, the legislation fails under the Fourteenth Amendment.249
She will elevate the mother's interests with the morality and formal real-
izability arguments; she will attack the government's justifications with
the economic efficiency, deterrence and institutional competence argu-
ments.250 Again, while I would never try to argue that only a CLS devo-
tee could come up with these arguments, I do believe that the theory can
help an attorney generate more and better policy arguments more
quickly than she otherwise would.
The plaintiff's attorney who is well-versed in the power calculus
strand of CLS theory espoused by Peter Gabel and others, will look
beyond the Fourteenth Amendment analysis to view law as part of a
broader social and political movement.25 1 This politicized attorney may
therefore seek to organize a political opposition to the legislation and
build coalitions of persons opposed to the legislation. This political
activist may, for example, focus on the adverse impact on African
Americans, Hispanics, and poor members of our society, that would
likely be caused by mandatory testing.252 That is, the supposedly benign
testing subordinates those groups already most subordinated in our soci-
ety. Even if the adverse impact would not support a claim of discrimina-
tion under the Constitution,253 the plaintiff's attorney might use this fact
248. See generally id. at 379-81. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 634 (1989), for example, the Court held that mandatory drug and urine tests are permissible
without a warrant or reasonable suspicion if the government can point to special or compelling
interests. Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679
(1989), the Court found that once the government establishes a special need for the information
sought, the courts must look only to whether the public interest in drug testing outweighs personal
privacy interests.
249. The attorney could use these arguments to support her position that the legislation fails
both because it infringes on the penumbra of privacy rights and because it violates the Fourth
Amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 218-39.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 240-47.
252. See, e.g., Taunya L. Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism, Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351 (1989-90).
253. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that to
establish discriminatory purpose in violation of the equal protection clause a plaintiff must show
that the policy was selected because of, and not just in spite of, its adverse impact); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
[Vol. 50:707
1996] SYMBIOTIC LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL PRACTICE 755
to generate political opposition to the legislation in the community.
Similarly, the politically active plaintiff's attorney may focus on the pre-
sumption upon which mandatory testing legislation would impliedly be
based: Why don't we trust mothers to have their newborns tested if such
testing is in their newborns' best interest? Do we trust women less than
men? Do we trust women who are members of minority groups less
than white women? Why is the statute geared to mandate testing rather
than to encourage testing through better education, protection of confi-
dentiality, and protection against discrimination? These kinds of social/
political issues might help the plaintiff's attorney to organize groups of
mothers, obtain assistance from already organized groups such as the
NOW or the NAACP, and to galvanize public opposition. On the other
hand, the attorney who remains narrowly rooted in the legal doctrine
will miss out on these opportunities.354
In sum, the CLS perspective offers both lobbyist and plaintiff's
attorney some tools or arguments they might not otherwise have used.
3. LAW AND ECONOMICS
a. Discussion of the Theory
The theory of "law and economics" applies the insights of
microeconomic theory to legal problems and policy decisions.
Accepting the premise that humans usually act as "rational" beings who
seek to maximize their utility by obtaining as many benefits as possible
(subject to their budgeting constraints), the theory examines legal issues
in terms of such phenomena as supply and demand, incentives, and costs
and benefits.255 At a more advanced level, many adherents of the law
and economics approach seek to take into account situations in which
the free market will not necessarily yield an optimal result-such as
where there is a lack of full information, where there are externalities or
public goods at issue, or where there is an unequal initial distribution of
goods.256 Law and economics analysis has been applied to an extremely
broad array of subject areas including, but certainly not limited to, con-
254. At a minimum, the doctrinally rooted attorney would define such activities as extrinsic to
her professional role.
255. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs (1988); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
256. One of the earliest and still best articles discussing these issues in a legal context is Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melarned, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
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tracts, 257 torts, 25 8 corporate law,259 criminal law, 2 6 0 family law, 26 1 land
use,262 and AIDS and the law.263
b. Insights for Lobbyist Opposing Legislation
Before commencing this analysis it is important to observe that
solid law and economics analysis requires empirical work as well as arm
chair analysis. As Professor David Charny points out in his review of
Professor Philipson's and Judge Posner's book on AIDS, any trend at
all, upward or downward, can be consistent with economic theory,
depending on the values assigned to certain variables and depending, as
economists would say, on the shape of the curves. 2  Nonetheless, I will
not attempt to engage in empirical analysis here, but will instead simply
lay out arguments that could ultimately be subjected to empirical testing.
A lobbyist opposing mandatory testing of newborns for HIV based
on law and economics arguments could break the analysis into two por-
tions. First, the lobbyist could argue that the added government regula-
tion is unnecessary in that the free market will assure an optimum level
of testing of newborns. 265 To support this argument the lobbyist will
point out that mothers can be assumed to love their children and that
mothers will therefore voluntarily have their children tested where the
test is in the child's best interest.266
257. E.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
258. E.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
259. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985). Most academic writing and teaching in the corporate law area is now
based at least in part on law and economic analysis. See generally WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (5th ed.
1993); ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (1993).
260. E.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232 (1985).
261. E.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX
AND REASON (1992); Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978).
Cf. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
262. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
263. TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993); David Chamy, Economics of Death,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2056 (1994) (reviewing and critiquing the Philipson and Posner analysis).
264. Charny, supra note 263, at 2059.
265. Actually, the lobbyist need not show that the free market result is a perfect result, but only
that it is preferable to the result that would occur under the regulation.
266. The mother might or might not have the child tested depending on such factors as the
accuracy of the test, the likelihood the child would benefit from her status being known (e.g. due
to the availability or absence of a cure), and the cost of the cure in terms of money and potential
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Advocates of testing will respond, however, that where the
mother's own HIV status will be revealed through the testing of the
child, we cannot presume that the mother will act in the child's best
interest at the expense of her own. To counter such arguments the lob-
byist opposing testing may also argue that the mandatory testing would,
given economic analysis, be counterproductive. By imposing a
mandatory test the government would be increasing the "cost" imposed
on a mother seeking medical services in connection with her pregnancy
and delivery. That is, the mother who opposed testing could seek to
avoid it by avoiding pre or post-natal medical treatment that would bring
her to the attention of the authorities. Thus, to escape testing, at least
some mothers would avoid medical treatment altogether by delivering
the child outside of a medical facility, thereby potentially inflicting even
greater harm on the child and on society as a whole.
The lobbyist opposing mandatory testing would also use economics
to argue that mandatory testing is not an efficient means of preventing
illness due to HIV. The lobbyist would compare the cost of mandatory
testing for all mothers to the likely benefit achieved from detecting a few
more cases of childhood HIV. The lobbyist would also argue it would
be cheaper and more effective to spend government money on providing
better information to prospective mothers, thereby encouraging them to
obtain testing voluntarily, than on a mandatory test.
Of course, none of these arguments are the exclusive property of
adherents of law and economics. However, those well-versed in law and
economics will likely be better able to generate these and other econom-
ics-related arguments than those less familiar with the field.
c. Insights for Plaintiff's Attorney Opposing Legislation
The plaintiff's attorney who is well-versed in law and economics
will use economic arguments to show that the legislation lacks a sound
policy foundation and is thus unconstitutional. Specifically, the plain-
tiff's attorney will challenge the statute on the grounds that it effectively
mandates a nonconsensual search of the mother, violates the mother's
privacy rights, and unconstitutionally discriminates between victims of
HIV and other viruses. The defendant will respond that nonconsensual
blood tests are permissible, notwithstanding any Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy interests, so long as they are supported by special or compelling
interests. The defendant will further argue that the distinction drawn
between HIV and other viruses is constitutional, so long as it is rational.
At this point the law and economics educated plaintiff's attorney
discrimination. This analysis also assumes that the mother possesses accurate information about
the advantages and disadvantages of the test.
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will use her economics to argue that the statute is very unwise, and thus
not supported by a compelling interest and not even rational. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff's attorney will make many of the same policy argu-
ments outlined above for the lobbyist. She will argue that the mandatory
testing statute is unnecessary given the mother's existing incentives, that
it would cost more than it would produce in benefits, and that it would
give mothers incentives to avoid professional medical assistance. Given
all of these problems, the plaintiff's attorney would assert the statute
lacks a rational basis and can not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
4. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
a. Discussion of the Theory
Feminist legal theory is quite diverse. While feminist theorists
share certain views and approaches, such as a focus on women and an
antipathy to patriarchy and the subjugation of women,2"7 it is impossible
to summarize feminist theory as a single unified body. Instead, drawing
on the foundational works of Alison Jaggar268 and others, I will attempt
to summarize some of the particular schools of feminist thought.269 I
will also take note of the substantial body of work focusing on feminist
methodology, and discuss how it relates to my own jurisprudence of
applications.
After summarizing certain feminist legal theories I will then show
how several particular feminist insights might prove useful to a litigator
or policymaker opposed to mandatory testing of newborns for HIV. A
number of feminist theorists have recently, and quite consciously,
focused on applying their works to both theory and practice.270 I will
build upon these books and articles.
"Liberal" feminists derive their name from the classic liberal phi-
losophy of John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill, Mary Wollstonecraft,
and others.27' The basic contention is that men and women are equal
267. See Introduction to FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 3 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) ("The rejection
of patriarchy is the one point on which all feminists agree.").
268. ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).
269. Even within the various schools of theory, feminists disagree on numerous issues.
Therefore, I again warn that my summary cannot do full justice to the theory.
270. See, e.g., COLKER, supra note 18; Fineman, supra note 18, at 25-26 (calling for
scholarship that would connect "grand theory" and "personal narratives"); Goldfarb, A Theory-
Practice Spiral, supra note 18; MacKinnon, supra note 17; Schneider, supra note 18; Woodhouse,
supra note 18.
271. See, e.g., HARRIET T. MILL, Enfranchisement of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 89
(Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970) (advocating not only suffrage but also equal access to education,
employment, and political life); JOHN S. MILL & HARRIET TAYLOR, Early Essays on Marriage and
Divorce, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY, supra, at 65; MARY WoLLsTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF
THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (Carol H. Poston ed., 2d ed. 1988) (1792) (advocating equal education).
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and should be treated equally and provided equal access to the public
sector. More controversially, liberal feminists believe that just as
women should not be restricted from access to certain jobs or education,
similarly, they should not receive special benefits because of their gen-
der. 72 Rather, the individualistic doctrine calls for equal access, equal
rights, and equal freedom.273
The "relational" or "cultural" feminists dispute the "liberal" posi-
tion that women and men are, and should be, treated the same. Greatly
influenced by the educational psychology enunciated by Carol Gilligan's
In a Different Voice,274 the relational feminists contend that men and
women interact with the world around them based on very different
moralities.27 Whereas the male morality focuses on what Gilligan calls
"the ethic of justice" based on abstract rules, principles, and rights, the
female morality is instead based on an "ethic of care." This female ethic
centers on concrete relationships, concern for others, and responsibility.
In one application of this view, theorist Leslie Bender speculated on the
differences that might exist in tort law were it based on the female rather
than the male moral view of the world.276 Robin West has argued that
essentially all of our jurisprudence would look very different if it were
based on a relational rather than an individualist conception of human
nature.
"Radical" feminists, such as Catharine MacKinnon,277 also chal-
lenge the view that men and women are essentially the same and should
See generally JAGGAR, supra note 268, at 27-50, 173-206 (discussing liberal feminists' theories of
human nature and of politics).
272. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 380 (1984-1985) (women
should not receive special benefits based on pregnancy, such as maternity leave, unless seecial
benefits are also afforded to comparably disabled men). Cf. ZILLAH R. ElSENSTEIN, THE FEMALE
BODY AND THE LAW 1 (1988) (critiquing the liberal position).
273. Robin West argues that the liberal individualist approach is itself masculine. She argues
that a truly feminist theory would emphasize connection, rather than separation. Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1988).
274. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
275. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978) (suggesting that women's world view is more connected
to others than is men's); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
276. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
33-36 (1988) (arguing, for example, for a rule establishing a duty to rescue to replace our current
no-duty rule).
277. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY].
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be treated as such.2 78 As MacKinnon puts it, sex discrimination is not
about difference or sameness but rather about dominance:
[A]n equality question is a question of the distribution of power.
Gender is also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy
and female subordination. The question of equality, from the stand-
point of what it is going to take to get it, is at root a question of
hierarchy, which-as power succeeds in constructing social percep-
tion and social reality-derivatively becomes a categorical distinc-
tion, a difference.279
According to the radicals, patriarchy or male dominance permeates
every aspect of our society. It is both foolish and impossible to seek to
"equalize" jobs or benefits for women as long as the basic patriarchal
structures continue to exist.
Yet, these sex-based differences are so pervasive as to be virtually
unrecognizable. As radical feminist Shulamith Firestone put it: "Sex
class is so deep as to be invisible."2 80 Specifically, the radicals focus on
the way in which such institutions and phenomena as marriage, child-
raising, pornography, and battering result in the subordination of
women.
28 1
Despite their fundamental differences, liberal, relational, and radi-
cal feminists share certain methodologies. An increasing number of
feminists have begun to emphasize the "anti-essentialist" point that it is
wrong to group all women together, thereby ignoring key distinctions
based on race, class, ethnicity, and sexual preference. They argue that in
grouping all women together some theoreticians implicitly assume that
all women are white, middle class, middle aged, non-disabled, and
heterosexual.282
More fundamentally, feminists tend to emphasize an experiential
analysis. 28 3 Rather than working top-down, by first formulating and
then applying abstract theories and concepts, feminists generally build
their analyses from the ground up.284 Relying on such methodologies as
278. See generally JAGGAR, supra note 268, at 83-122, 249-302 (discussing radical feminists'
theories of human nature and of politics).
279. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 277, at 40.
280. SHULAM1TH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECmIC OF SEx: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION 1
(1970).
281. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979);
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 277; MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY, supra note 277.
282. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 206 (1989-1990); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
283. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 619-21
(1990).
284. Katharine Bartlett observes that feminists both ground their theories in practical problems
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consciousness-raising 285 and narrative scholarship,2 86 feminists often try
to tie their work closely to the experiences of real women.
Clearly my own jurisprudence of applications shares with the femi-
nists a concern with the real world. However, whereas most feminist
analysis tends to emphasize development of the theory itself, my own
focus is primarily on the application of the theory, once developed, and
on adequately communicating the theory to legal practitioners. Thus, I
see the two approaches as related and complementary, but not the same.
b. Insights for Lobbyist Opposing Legislation
Feminist legal theory provides the insight that women should not
be subordinated or treated as inferior to men.287 Nor should women be
treated as mere vessels made for carrying unborn children.288 Lobbyists
opposed to mandatory testing of newborns for HIV might use this argu-
ment to bolster their position that, at least absent a very clear benefit to
the children, testing should not be imposed. Requiring the testing of
newborns without regard for its effect on mothers, is effectively saying
that mothers must endure any hardship that might possibly prove benefi-
cial to the child. In other words, society is treating the woman as an
incubator and mother, rather than as a person in her own right.
A number of feminists have spelled out similar arguments in dis-
cussing abortion. Sylvia Law, for example, has argued that anti-abortion
laws effectively force women, but not men, to bear the burdens of an
unwanted pregnancy, thereby imposing an inferior status on women.289
Frances Olsen argues that "[t]reating a fetus as morally equivalent to a
child . . . is yet another example of society's tendency to devalue the
and further rely on "practical reasoning." Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REv. 829, 850 (1990).
285. Catharine MacKinnon has called consciousness raising "the major technique of analysis,
structure of organization, method of practice, and theory of social change of the women's
movement." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 519 (1982) (footnote omitted).
286. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 47; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
287. Liberal feminists, radical feminists, relational feminists, and socialist feminists all share
this view. The radical feminists place the greatest emphasis, however, on abolishing institutions
that subordinate women. They also focus on revealing how certain seemingly commonplace
assumptions reflect society's sexist attitudes. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
288. In PREGNANT MEN, Professor Ruth Colker analyzes in detail the closely related question
of how society should treat pregnant women. COLKER, supra note 18. She concludes that "[t]he
challenge for feminists is to get society to view women's reproductive capacity accurately and
compassionately rather than to insist that it is irrelevant in women's lives." Id. at 165. Thus, she
compares the way pregnant women are treated to the way men are, or would be, treated in the
most closely analogous situations such as surrogate parenthood.
289. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1014
(1984).
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work that women do. . . . [and that] [p]rohibiting abortion denigrates
women as moral decisionmakers, and it reinforces their role as sexual
objects .... 290 While the abortion context can be distinguished on the
ground that a newborn, unlike a fetus, is indisputably a person, the gist
of the argument is really the same: women should not be treated as mere
incubators for their children.29'
Lobbyists opposed to mandatory testing might also draw on the
anti-essentialist position taken by many modern feminists.292 Specifi-
cally, they could argue that while purporting to treat all women the
same, the mandatory testing in fact has a far more detrimental impact on
poor women and women of color. Assuming the mandatory testing were
done on a state by state basis, it would be imposed most frequently on
those women who, due to poverty, could not avail themselves of the
local laws by "escaping" to a state that did not impose testing. Even if
mandatory testing were done nationally, its effects would likely be
harshest on those poor women who, for example because they rent,
would face eviction if their status were revealed. Poor women and
women of color will also be affected disproportionately because they are
disproportionately HIV infected. 93
This anti-essentialist approach is advocated, for example, by Pro-
fessor Ruth Colker. She argues that the Supreme Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,294 striking
down a spousal notification requirement but upholding a twenty-four
hour waiting period in abortion cases, reflects an essentialist approach to
women and is therefore discriminatory. She states:
The Court understood the problem of violence in the private sphere
for pregnant married women, who are disproportionately older,
white, and middle class, but did not understand this problem for preg-
nant unmarried women, who are disproportionately younger, dispro-
portionately African-American, and poor. Thus, the Court in Casey
overturned the spousal notification requirement but did not overturn
the waiting period requirement. This blindness on the part of the
Court is a reflection of the essentialist perspective that the Court uses
290. Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105, 120-21 (1989).
291. Although the fetus is arguably not a person, some might contend that the state has
stronger grounds for prohibiting abortions than for mandating testing for HIV. Whereas a
successful abortion will definitely prevent the birth of a child, determining that a newborn is HIV
positive may not lead to any increase in the quality or length of the child's life. See Sternlight,
supra note 28, at 374.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 282-85.
293. Taunya L. Banks, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Reproductive Rights of
HIV-Infected Women, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 57, 360-61 (1994).
294. 505 U.S. 883 (1992).
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when considering the reality of women's lives.295
That is, whereas the twenty-four hour waiting period might not impose a
hardship on a middle class woman, it might make abortion impossible
for a poor woman who had already traveled far from home and given
various excuses for her absence to her employer and others. Policy
makers who are particularly concerned about the welfare of poor women
and women of color may be swayed by these arguments. At a mini-
mum, familiarity with feminist analysis would better prepare the lobby-
ist to confront a potentially patriarchal legislature.
c. Insights for Plaintiff's Attorney Opposing Legislation
Feminist theory offers the plaintiff's attorney opposed to
mandatory testing the insight that arguing based on principles of equal-
ity may be more successful than arguing based on privacy or due pro-
cess. A number of feminists have observed that privacy arguments can
be troubling in that "the legal concept of privacy can and has shielded
the place of battery, marital rape, and women's exploited labor; has pre-
served the central institutions whereby women are deprived of identity,
autonomy, control and self-definition .... Thus, in the area of abor-
tion, for example, a number of commentators have urged that restrictions
on abortion violate the equal protection clause. 29 7 Similarly, the attor-
ney opposed to mandatory testing of newborns might choose to fight the
measure on equal protection rather than privacy grounds.
A plaintiff's attorney opposing the mandatory testing on equal pro-
tection grounds might look to feminist theories of equality or
antisubordination for support. However, as Professor Ruth Colker elo-
quently discusses in Pregnant Men,298 the attorney attempting to present
such arguments faces two major doctrinal hurdles: Geduldig v.
Aiello,2 99 in which the Supreme Court held that discrimination on the
295. COLKER, supra note 18, at 91.
296. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 277, at 101; see also Olsen, supra note
290, at 111-14.
297. Olsen, supra note 290, at 118 (citing articles by various authors). Olsen further argues
that the Court itself has begun to recognize a gender dimension to the abortion debate. Id. at 117.
298. See COLKER, supra note 18, at 129-30.
299. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In ruling that a state run disability plan that denied coverage to
pregnant women was not unconstitutional the Court stated:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification .... The
lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program
divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members
of both sexes.
Id. at 496 n.20.
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basis of pregnancy is not on its face intentional sex discrimination; 30 0
and Massachusetts v. Feeney,30' holding that in order for a plaintiff to
show a law is unconstitutionally discriminatory on the basis of sex,
plaintiff must show that the statute was adopted because of, and not
merely in spite of, its adverse impact on women.3 °2 Feminist theories
may offer a route around or over the doctrinal hurdles created by
Geduldig and Feeney. Geduldig poses a roadblock to those who espouse
a liberal feminist view of equality. Whereas the liberal feminists depend
on an argument that women are essentially the same as men,30 3 the
Supreme Court has found that the ability to become pregnant is a differ-
ence that justifies different treatment. However, the feminist can
attempt to distinguish Geduldig by using radical feminist theory oppos-
ing the subordination of women by men. Specifically, rather than argu-
ing that women and men are identical, the attorney could argue that the
mandatory testing legislation would not have been imposed if it would
have revealed the HIV status of the father, and not just the mother.30 4
That is, the attorney would argue that the differences between men and
women do not justify the social subordination of women.
One tack plaintiff's counsel might take to present this argument
doctrinally would be to emphasize the Court's recent decision in Inter-
national Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.311 In that case the Court, over-
ruling both the trial court and the court of appeals, held that pursuant to
Title VII,30 6 and the Pregnancy Act of 1978307 it was impermissible for
the employer to exclude from the workplace women who were or might
become pregnant in order to protect their potential unborn children. The
300. Technically, one could try to distinguish Geduldig with the argument that mandatory
testing is not being applied to pregnant women but rather to women who have just given birth.
Nonetheless, it is likely that the Court would reach a similar conclusion: a mere focus on persons
who have just given birth is not sex discrimination. If the plaintiff could convince the court that
discrimination based on childbirth was sex discrimination the statute would be entitled to
"intermediate" level scrutiny and would be upheld only if the state could demonstrate that the
statute served an important governmental interest and was substantially related to that objective.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Otherwise, the statute would be reviewed under a
mere "rational basis" test.
301. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
302. Id. at 279. The Court found that only those statutes that discriminate intentionally are
unconstitutional. While the plaintiff's attorney might also conclude, based on her theoretical
analysis, that the prevailing Supreme Court cases are flatly wrong and ought to be overruled, I will
focus primarily on how the attorney might attempt to use her theory to win within the constraints
of existing doctrine.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 275-77.
304. But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to
Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 35 n.129 (1992) (arguing that
counterfactual hypotheticals are not useful).
305. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
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Court explained: "It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for
individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is
more important to herself and her family than her economic role. Con-
gress has left this choice to the woman as hers to make. '30 8  In other
words, the Court found that it was inappropriate to treat the woman as a
mere vessel holding the life of her potential unborn child.309  While
International Union is a Title VII employment discrimination case, and
thus not immediately applicable in this nonemployment context, it sup-
ports plaintiffs' position that women must not be subordinated based on
their reproductive status.31 International Union recognizes the argua-
bly radical position that the mere possession of female reproductive
organs cannot justify social exclusion and oppression.
Plaintiff's counsel may use feminist anti-essentialist theory to sup-
port a second equality argument in opposition to the mandatory HIV
testing. Plaintiff's counsel could argue that the statute must be
examined in terms of its detrimental impact on those women least able
to cope. The HIV virus has been shown to disproportionately affect
poor women and women of color.3 1 Those same women, once revealed
to be HIV infected by the mandatory testing of their newborns, would be
vulnerable to discrimination with respect to employment, housing, insur-
ance, medical care, and other benefits. Yet, no men would be so endan-
gered by the mandatory testing. Plaintiff's counsel could use these facts
and arguments to claim intentional sex discrimination.312
In other words, even if the statute might be found constitutional as
308. 499 U.S. at 211.
309. The petitioners and amici curiae emphasized in their briefs that the employer's policy of
excluding all potentially fertile women from the workplace was based on a stereotype that
"women are marginal workers whose economic importance and need for employment is
necessarily subordinate to their child bearing role." Brief for Petitioner at 24, International Union
(No. 89-1215). Petitioners further observed that the employer's "logic" would "permit employers
to exclude all fertile women from almost all nonsedentary jobs and many other positions as well."
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, International Union (No. 89-1215).
310. But cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981) (holding that it is constitutional to
apply military draft to men but not to women because women are intrinsically not combat ready);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977) (deciding that it is legitimate to exclude
women from positions in men's maximum security prison based on possibility women might be
raped, which the Court labeled as a vulnerability essential to womanhood).
311. Banks, supra note 293, at 360-61.
312. See generally Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place,
Asserting our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989) (arguing that African-American.
women should be viewed as a distinct group, separate from either the group of all women or the
group of all African-Americans, and that this group should be allowed to prevail on a
discrimination claim even where the two larger groups could not). Admittedly, it may be tough to
convince the current Court that these actions evidence intent. See Eric Schnapper, Two
Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31 (1982) (advocating a
broadening of the concept of intent).
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applied to white middle class women, it should be found unconstitu-
tional as applied to poorer members of society. Professor Ruth Colker
used just such an argument in the amicus brief she drafted in Barnes v.
Moore,313 a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case on the constitutionality
of a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period in abortion cases.
Colker argued that the waiting period would have a particularly detri-
mental effect on women who were poor, adolescent, involved in abusive
relations, or disabled.314 Such women would be least able to arrange the
minimum of two visits to an abortion clinic necessitated by the waiting
period. Again, the point is that even if some (white, upper middle class)
women might be able to cope with the waiting requirement, the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to the many women who are not as privi-
leged. Although the arguments failed in Barnes,31 5 it may well be
accepted by another court or in another context.
Finally, the plaintiff's attorney might attempt to use her feminist
arguments to convince the Court to reverse its earlier ruling in Feeney
and/or Geduldig. Yet, while feminist antisubordination theories, for
example, certainly favor the reversal of both cases, this does not seem a
particularly fruitful approach given the Court's current composition.
5. CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, AND
FEMINIST THEORY
Through my examination of the HIV hypothetical I have attempted
to demonstrate that each of the three abstract theories provide practical
insights for both lobbyists and litigators. However, it is not critical to
my general argument that each and every component of these analyses
be accepted. No doubt each reader will find certain of my specific argu-
ments are less convincing than others.
Nonetheless, I may have succeeded in my mission. My goal was
not to dispositively prove the unconstitutionality (or even undesirability)
of mandatory testing of newborns for HIV. To do so I would certainly
have had to try to muster some empirical data in support of my argu-
ments. Rather, I sought only to provide the insight that abstract theories
can and should have practical applications. In fact, if, through the criti-
quing of my presentation and analysis, better ways to apply these or
other abstract theories are conceived, then I am delighted. The whole
313. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992).
314. See COLKER, supra note 18, app. at 215 (copy of amicus brief).
315. The Fifth Circuit upheld the statute as constitutional within hours of the oral argument.
Id. at 28.
[Vol. 50:707
1996] SYMBIOTIC LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL PRACTICE 767
point is to encourage others to see and explicate the possible practical
value of abstract theory.
C. The Need to Develop a Jurisprudence of Applications
Great optimists may believe that the mere recognition of the rele-
vance of abstract legal theory to the nuts-and-bolts practice of law will
mend the rift between theory and practice. Law professors will be able
to teach abstract theory to their hearts' content; law students will absorb
the theory; and ultimately, the law students will go on to become legal
practitioners who can use abstract theories to solve practical problems.
Unfortunately, little in life, or certainly legal education, is so sim-
ple. Not all abstract theories devised by law professors are necessarily
useful to the real world of law practice. Even if inspired by a real world
event, some theories may prove to have no practical relevance whatso-
ever in that the proposed solutions will simply never be accepted. 316
Further, even where an abstract, theory can be relevant to legal practice,
the relevance of such abstract theory will not always be readily apparent.
Rather, a jurisprudence of application must be developed to connect
abstract theory to the world of practice. Theorists must not simply pro-
duce grand works and then place all the burden of an application on
practitioners. Instead, they must show the student and practitioner how
the theory can help them in their daly tasks.
A few legal academics have already recognized the crucial need for
a jurisprudence of applications. For example, Harry H. Wellington, for-
mer Dean of Yale Law School, argued in 1987 that potentially valuable
academic work has less influence than it should because "too few [aca-
demics] are doing the applied work that should be an important part of
the mission of law schools. ' 317 Feminist theorists including Ruth Colker
and Elizabeth M. Schneider have recognized the need for a link between
feminist theory and practice, and also attempted to develop such a link
316. See generally Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, supra note 149; Farber, Brilliance
Revisited, supra note 149 (criticizing theories that, while clever, contribute little to the solution of
real world problems).
317. Wellington, supra note 199, at 329; see also Wellington, supra note 7. Somewhat
similarly Paul Carrington, former Dean of Duke University School of Law, has argued that in
order to have more influence in the real world, legal scholarship should follow the path of the
physical sciences by limiting its sights and emphasizing work that "rediscovers reality", as
opposed to focusing primarily on "transcendent" scholarship. See Carrington, supra note 24, at
803. But, Carrington seems less sure than Wellington that the abstract theory can itself have
practical value. Id. at 802 (Legal academics face "an unwelcome reality that there is often a
choice to be made between work that can and may be applied usefully to current public issues and
work that is intellectually more ambitious, more personally gratifying, and more likely to win
recognition among academians.").
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
in their work.3"8 Moreover, as discussed earlier, the Carnegie Founda-
tion's Boyer Report concluded in 1990 that academics throughout higher
education need to work toward developing more applications-oriented
scholarship.3"9
I believe the absence of a real commitment to a jurisprudence of
applications within legal academia today helps explain many otherwise
puzzling contradictions. The absence of a discipline connecting theory
and practice helps explain why, even given academia's recognition in
principle that law schools should serve practitioners, students and practi-
tioners find that much of what academia has to offer is irrelevant. The
absence of a jurisprudence of applications also helps explain why theory
and practice seem to be moving further apart, even as many academics
and practitioners recognize that the two ought to be integrated.
VI. POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
While I believe that both academics and practitioners need to work
on developing interconnections between theory and practice, I hold aca-
demics more responsible than practitioners for developing the jurispru-
dence of applications. Academics have both the understanding of theory
and the time necessary to develop applications. Practitioners may well
have neither.
A. Academia's Role in Developing a Link Between Theory
and Practice
1. CONSEQUENCES FOR TEACHING
Legal academics should work toward developing a link between
theory and practice in their teaching by first providing students with
theoretical insights and then also taking the next and, often quite diffi-
cult, step of showing them how the theory can effectively be used by a
practitioner.3 20 Thus the first step a professor or school must take to
forge the link between theory and practice is to teach theory, and not just
318. COLKER, supra note 18; Schneider, supra note 18. Schneider writes that her article, a
nuts-and-bolts guide on representing battered women which draws upon feminist theory, was
inspired by her "sense of disconnection between the two dimensions of [her] own work, feminist
theory and feminist practice." Id. at 521. See also Fineman, supra note 18 (positing that feminist
scholars should seek to fill the gap between "grand theory" and personal narratives); Schneider,
supra note 200 (urging need for greater link between theory and practice in teaching civil
procedure).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
320. But see Reingold, supra note 161, at 2007 (suggesting that given where law schools are
going, the integration of theory and practice is more likely to come from the students, and move
upward to the professors, than from professors down to students).
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focus on "black letter law" or doctrine. Schools may, find it efficient to
teach a number of alternative theoretical perspectives simultaneously,
perhaps in a first year jurisprudence course.321 Whether or not such a
course is taught, individual professors should provide students with the-
oretical perspectives relevant to their courses.
Next, the school or teacher that provides theoretical perspectives
must also show students how these perspectives can be applied in prac-
tice.322 Assuming, xfor example, that a teacher chooses to use a law and
economics approach and/or a feminist theory approach to help the stu-
dents gain new insights about family law, that professor should also
show the students how those types of arguments can be used by a litiga-
tor, judge, lobbyist, or legislator handling certain specific family law
issues. Developing the connections between theory and practice is diffi-
cult,323 and thus very valuable. 324  Students cannot be expected to
develop such a jurisprudence on their own. 31 Professors must help by
at least providing students with real and concrete examples of how the
particular theory can be applied.326
Professors may find it effective to use a problem-oriented or trans-
actional teaching method, 327 at least for a portion of the course, to give
321. Some schools are already teaching such courses. A new text has recently been written for
use, inter alia, in the first year of law school. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER (1994).
322. E.g., BOYER, supra note 103, at 77 (concluding that in academia generally there is a
greater need for applied work which builds bridges between theory and practice); Janus, supra
note 196, at 463 (claiming the great value of clinical education is that, as all legal education
should, it links theory, practice, and values). As stated, some professors and schools are already
attempting to blend theory and practice. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 1982-85
(describing authors attempt to blend theory and practice in a course entitled "Child, Parent, and
State"); Tapes of Workshop on the Transactional Approach to Law, supra note 118 (On tape six,
Professor Victor Goldberg of Columbia describes the course he teaches integrating and applying
law and economics concepts to deal making.).
323. See Elson, supra note 113, at 351 (educating students for practice can be more complex
than teaching pure theory).
324. See generally Wellington, supra note 7, at 5 ("[T1oo few are doing the applied work that
should be an important part of the mission of law schools.").
325. Cf. Posner, supra note 163, at 1927 (although much interdisciplinary scholarship is
potentially valuable, much of it is bad in that it is not comprehensible to its audience-students);
James J. White, Letter to Judge Harry Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2183 (1993)
(maintaining that students don't benefit from a lot of heavy theory because they "do not have the
intellectual enzymes to transform these abstract ideas into digestible, intellectual food .... The
teacher sees manifold opportunities to apply his theories in other courses, but the students cannot
see beyond the horizon that consists of a merciful escape from the torment of theory.").
326. Wellington, supra note 199, at 329 (more law professors should do applied work). In
order to assist professors in bridging the theory/practice gap, one former judge suggests that
professors take periodic sabbaticals to work in a law office. Edward D. Re, Law Office
Sabbaticals for Law Professors, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 95, 97 (1995).
327. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Professor Blasi observes:
The insights of cognitive science provide additional support for considering a
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
students an opportunity to apply some of the theories they have
learned. 328 Law school teachers may also find it effective to broaden the
scope of their teaching to include not only analysis of appellate cases but
also some discussion of other legal skills such as fact-gathering, devel-
oping lawyer/client relationships, reviewing actual legal documents, and
choosing between various alternative solutions to legal problems.329 By
so broadening the scope of their courses professors may find it easier to
show students how various legal theories can help the students be effec-
tive in as lawyers. Professors who not only teach theory, but also teach
students how theory can be applied, will likely find both that student
interest in the theory is enhanced, and that student understanding of the
theory is improved.33° I also believe that by teaching students how to
apply theory professors will help students happier with their law school
experience. Too often those students who are least familiar with theoret-
ical approaches find the most theoretical course tortuous and highly
damaging to their self-esteem. Combining theory with practice would
provide a more validating experience to those students who have strong
interpersonal or practical skills but lack a background in theory.
Legal academics should also work to enhance the connection
between theory and practice by changing their expressed negative atti-
tudes towards practice and even teaching. Academics, in their teaching,
mentoring, and scholarly capacities, should cease making comments that
lead students to see theory and practice as conflicting with one another.
Instead, academics should attempt to help students see those disciplines
as symbiotically supportive. Similarly, academics should cease dispar-
aging practice and practitioners. Too many academics, consciously or
not, encourage students to see legal practice (to which most of the stu-
dents are headed) as an intellectual wasteland.
problem-based curriculum more analogous to the curricula now being widely
adopted in medical education, a "case method" closer to that of the modem Harvard
Business School than to the method Langdell brought to Harvard Law School, now
emulated throughout American legal education.
Blasi, supra note 18, at 319.
328. Gordon, supra note 21, at 1963 (advocating a problem-oriented approach to teaching, as a
means of introducing reality into the classroom).
329. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 79, at 612 (claiming that law schools are currently
failing to provide law students with the full array of necessary skills); Wellington, supra note 7, at
6 (arguing that law professors must focus not only on appellate analysis but also on such other
aspects of practice as strategic decisions, definition of goals, evaluation of means, uncovering of
facts, and oral and written communications). My point is that it is not enough merely to add skills
components to law school courses. Rather, professors must show how abstract theory can help
solve practical problems discussed in a skills portions of a class.
330. Michelman, supra note 160, at 353-54 ("It is axiomatic in learning theory that when
cognitive studies are accompanied by active engagement in their application to concrete problems,
a likely result is fuller comprehension, better retention, and apter recall of the cognitive
material.").
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Too many academics also value scholarship far more highly than
teaching.331 While it is to some extent natural and understandable that
legal academics, who have themselves chosen the law school over the
law firm, would prefer academia to practice, such academics do a real
disservice to their students when they criticize practice. Moreover, such
academics also do a disservice to their theoretical scholarship when they
fail to show students the relevance, and thus power, of their theories.
Instead, too often students accept the professors' point that the worlds of
practice and theory have little in common and then go on to embrace the
world of practice and reject the world of theory.
Similarly, legal academics should consider modifying their atti-
tudes with regard to hiring practitioners. Currently many law schools,
and particularly the most elite schools, regard substantial practical expe-
rience negatively. The premier hiring prospect is a person who did very
well at an elite school, perhaps possesses a graduate degree in a field
such as philosophy or history, went on to do a prestigious appellate
clerkship, and then obtained approximately four or fewer years of prac-
tice experience before deciding to move to academia. A candidate who
possessed otherwise identical credentials, but had ten years of practice
rather than four, might well be rated lower. 332 Yet, it is those practition-
ers who may be best qualified to help bridge the gap between theory and
practice. Having been in practice for a substantial number of years, they
are in an excellent position to identify and advocate the value of legal
theory.
I believe that at a minimum academics should not refuse to hire
otherwise qualified persons simply because such persons have suppos-
edly been tarnished by too much practice.333 I also suggest that law
schools consider broadening their hiring pool to consider persons with
more varied backgrounds. Where an important goal is narrowing the
gap between theory and practice by building a jurisprudence of applica-
tions, a candidate with more impressive practical experience but less
impressive purely academic credentials may sometimes be the better
choice. More generally, law schools should hire persons with an array
331. See Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 1993-94 (lamenting that teaching has become a low
status activity in legal academia).
332. Many legal academics apparently believe that the learning curve in practice is extremely
steep, and that someone with three or four years of experience possesses as much practical skill
and knowledge as someone with ten years of experience. My own view is different. Because law
practice requires a broad array of skills including legal analysis, counseling, writing, and creative
problem solving, I believe that additional experience provides substantial additional reward.
Clients, who are often willing to pay more to have a partner, generally seem to share this view.
333. This reluctance may reflect a natural tendency to hire in one's own image, and thus avoid
the threat of a new model of professor who may ultimately set standards the old guard cannot
easily meet.
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of different talents and life experiences, rather than hiring all professors
from a single mold.334
Finally, legal academics and administrators should rethink their cri-
teria with respect to admitting students to law school. Once we begin to
reenvision legal theory and law schools as directed to solving the
problems of the real world, we may conclude that the LSAT and even
undergraduate grade point averages are not the most accurate measures
of who would perform best in law school or as a lawyer. As Professor
Gary Peller explains, the culture of rationality and impersonality that
currently permeates our law schools is not inevitable but rather reflects
certain Western cultural biases.335 Peller points out that if we were to
transform our view of law schools to value cooperation and empathy,
rather than competitiveness, dispassion, and aloofness, different people
would be deemed qualified to enter law schools and would succeed.336
As we gradually change law school curriculum, along with hiring
and admission practices, to better solve our actual problems, I believe
we will create a powerful and synergistic mechanism for social change.
By attempting to address practical problems we will tend to become less
elitist and more diverse in terms of class, race, and ethnicity.337 After
all, many of the world's most pressing problems are themselves con-
cerned with issues of race, class, and ethnicity. In turn, as law schools
become more diverse they will naturally tend to focus more on solving
real world problems, rather than on issues of pure and abstract theory.
2. CONSEQUENCES FOR SCHOLARSHIP
Legal academics should take a variety of specific steps to develop
links between theory and practice in their scholarship. First, in selecting
topics about which to write, legal academics should take into account the
334. Cf. Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEo. L.J. 1845 (1994) (arguing that narrative scholarship is
enhanced by encouraging members of traditionally excluded groups to tell their stories).
335. Gary Peller, Espousing a Positive Vision of Affirmative-Action Policies, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Dec. 18, 1991, at BI, B2.
336. Id.
337. For discussions of elitism within American law schools and legal scholarship, see
generally Bell, supra note 46 (discussing racism and elitism at Harvard Law School); WiLUAMS,
supra note 47 (reflecting on her experiences as a black female law professor); Richard Delgado,
The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 1349, 1351 (1992) (discussing mechanisms used to exclude minority voices, ten years
after originally identifying the problem); Benita Ramsey, Introduction to Symposium, Excluded
Voices: Realities in Law and Law Reform, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 1 (1987) (discussing "how
differences in opinions, motivations, and language can construct social and political ideas that
may form the basis for law reform"); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073
(1989) (including articles by Milner S. Ball, Derrick Bell, Mari J. Matsuda, Patricia Williams, and
Steven L. Winter, discussing the significance of diverse voices in legal scholarship).
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potential practical applications of their work. All else being equal the
legal academic should lean toward writing articles that will likely pro-
vide the most assistance to practicing attorneys, judges, lobbyists, and
legislators. That is, to the extent that legal academics choose to focus
their efforts on legal theory, the theoretical analysis should arise out of
concern for real world problems, and a recognition of which solutions
may be actually viable. If a particular theory has no imaginable rele-
vance to practicing attorneys, judges, or legislators, legal academics
should generally not focus their efforts on developing that theory.
Of course, I do recognize that law schools do not exist solely to
serve practice and policymakers. Law schools also exist in part to serve
an intellectual role-as a member of the larger university. After all,
academics are among the few members of our society who have time to
reflect on issues that lack immediate urgency. Thus, I concede that legal
academics may sometimes be justified in devoting their efforts to theo-
ries not directly geared to practice or real world problems. I also recog-
nize that legal theories that initially have no apparent practical relevance
may later be found to have a value.338 I do not seek to discourage all
creative theorizing.
However, law is an applied field and legal theory should primarily
be directed to real world problems. My point with regard to topic selec-
tion is not that pure theorizing should be eliminated altogether, but
rather that a much smaller percentage of legal academics' time should be
devoted to theories with no apparent practical application. While I do
not suggest that all law review articles must have immediately apparent
practical applications, I do believe relevance to real world problems
should count as a positive and not a negative.
Of course, development of a new theory or analysis is a difficult
task that may take place in various stages, and it would not be appropri-
ate to require theoreticians to fully develop the practical implications of
their theory before presenting their analysis. Nonetheless, I suggest that
theoreticians engage in the following mental exercise before devoting
vast portions of their lives to a new theory. The theoreticians should
picture themselves presenting their work, together with any valuable
applications they think it may have, to a room filled with practicing
attorneys, judges, and legislators who are interested only in performing
338. Colleague Mark Seidenfeld, in reviewing an earlier draft of this work, recounted a story to
demonstrate this point. He said that the great German mathematician, Bernhard Riemann, having
developed a geometry of curved spaces in varying numbers of dimensions, proudly proclaimed
that he had at last developed a geometry unconnected to the real world. About fifty years later,
Albert Einstein used Riemann's work as the basis for his physics of gravity, showing that
Riemannian geometry was in fact connected to reality. See MICHAEL WHITE & JOHN GRIBBEN,
EINSTEIN: A LIFE IN SCIENCE 129-30 (1994).
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their jobs well. If the room's reaction is total boredom and confusion,
then the theoretician should consider working on another project. Once
a theory has been presented it is entirely appropriate for us to judge it, at
least in part, by the extent to which the theory has or is likely to have
real world value.
Second, moving beyond topic selection, legal academics should
focus their work not only on "pure" theory, but also on the application of
theory to practice.339 In order for students, practicing lawyers, judges,
and policy makers to understand the valuable contributions that can be
made by theory, someone needs to write about those potentially valuable
contributions. One cannot expect students and practitioners to develop a
jurisprudence of practical applications on their own: academics must
lead the way and show that the theories can have real world value.
Rather than sneering at such applied work academics should value it as
highly or more highly than the most theoretical works.
Third, academics need to present their theories in forms that can
readily be understood by nonacademics. Too often legal academic writ-
ing is quite obscure and difficult to understand.34 ° While occasionally,
perhaps, obscurity is warranted by the extreme complexity of the sub-
ject, more often obscurity is unnecessary. At a minimum, academics
ought to be able to draft versions of their work that would be under-
standable to students and practitioners. They may then choose to draft
more complex versions for fellow academics as well.34'
Some might object to "watering down" their works merely to make
them comprehensible to students or practitioners. However, I believe
this is the wrong way to think about this issue. Philosophers have long
debated whether a tree falling in the forest makes any noise if no one is
there to hear it. While reasonable people may disagree about the tree,
few could deny that a theory that is incomprehensible to most of its
supposed audience has little value. For theoreticians to have any kind of
significant impact on the real world they must make their theories rele-
vant and comprehensible to that world.342 In fact, theoreticians will
likely find that taking the effort to base their theories on, and apply their
339. See BoYEi, supra note 103, at 21-23 (calling for all academics to place greater emphasis
on applied work); Wellington, supra note 199; Wellington, supra note 7.
340. Cf. Gordon, supra note 180, at 2103-04. While recognizing that law review articles are
often quite reader-unfriendly, Gordon attributes this failing more to academics' unrealistically
high expectations of practitioners' interest than to academics' disdain for practitioners. Id.
341. See White, supra note 325, at 2183 (students may not be capable of grasping complex
legal theories).
342. Id. (students, unassisted, cannot be expected to understand or apply "a whole lot of heavy
theory").
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theories to, the real world will lead to the development of stronger more
durable theories.
3. RESPONSES TO COUNTERARGUMENTS
Some academic theorists may take umbrage with my views, fearing
that I am trying to deprive them of the opportunity to theorize about
whatever they might wish, in the manner they find most rewarding.
They may further argue that the scholar who is most capable of develop-
ing a truly insightful theory will not necessarily have the interest or abil-
ity to develop practical applications for that theory.
I have several responses. First, I believe my views are very sup-
portive of, rather than hostile to, legal theory. In some ways I value
theory more than many theorists in that I, unlike some of them, think
that the theories can have direct relevance to legal practitioners. If theo-
rists can successfully develop a jurisprudence of law and practical appli-
cations, demonstrating the direct relevance of their theories, I believe the
role of abstract theory in law schools and legal practice will be greatly
enhanced.
Second, as noted above, I do not believe that all legal theories
presented in law school classes or legal journals must necessarily have a
direct practical application. I recognize that law schools and legal jour-
nals serve multiple purposes. Thus, while I do believe that most theories
and theorists should be geared toward real world problems, I also see
value in a limited amount of non-practically oriented theory.
Third, not all legal theorists must turn to applied work. Rather, I
would expect that many scholars would spend all or part of their time on
pure theory, as opposed to working on practical applications of that the-
ory. My point is not that all theorists need to do applied work, but rather
that all theorists should value such work and that substantially more
legal academics need to devote themselves to connecting theory to prac-
tice. Currently far fewer academics are doing applied work, as called for
in this Article, than are engaging in pure theoretical analysis. 343 While
many theoreticians admittedly take step one, by writing about real world
problems, they often don't take the next steps of showing practitioners
how the theories can be used to draft actual legislation or agreements or
to win a case in litigation. Nor can practitioners be expected to fill this
void. They have neither the time nor perhaps the ability to produce such
analysis, particularly given the dense nature of many legal theories.
Rather, it is the academic who develops the theory who is in the best
position to explicate any practical value the theory may have. Even if
343. See Wellington, supra note 199, at 329 (claiming that too few legal academics "are doing
the applied work that should be an important part of the mission of law schools").
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some theorists are ultimately required to redirect some of their energy
from pure theory to practical applications, this would not necessarily be
a bad or unfair thing. Legal academics ought to be responsive to the
needs of law students, practitioners, and our society.
From the opposite perspective, some may also object that I am
overly optimistic as to the potential value of abstract theory. However, I
do not mean to suggest that all theories, particularly in their current
forms, can have immediate practical applications. 3" Some theories
may, for example, consist of a critique of a current body of law or legal
institution that may not, at least in the short term, provide immediate
assistance to practicing attorneys, judges, or legislators. Some theories
may be so unrelated to real world problems or so internally inconsistent
that they may never have a real world application. My point is not that
all theories have practical application but that many theories can have
practical value, and that theoreticians should strive for some practical
application-if not to litigation then to judging or lawmaking.
B. Consequences for Practicing Attorneys, Judges, and Policymakers
Practicing attorneys, judges, and policymakers must also play roles
in developing the symbiotic relationship between theory and practice.
Too often, practitioners reject works and theories of legal academics
out-of-hand, assuming without even investigating that academics will
have no relevant input on any given issue. However, academics, in fact,
may have a great deal to offer practitioners. Whereas practitioners may
sometimes continue to see and deal with problems in the same way they
have always done, academics offer new and creative ways of solving
legal problems.
Particularly as academics begin to develop a jurisprudence of prac-
tical applications, and their works become more accessible to practition-
ers, practitioners must look to academia for help on practical problems.
That is, when looking for ideas on how to win cases, decide cases, or
write legislation, practitioners should think back to their law school
training, seek continuing legal education, and look to law review articles
or books written by legal academics. Practitioners should not assume
that all theory is irrelevant nor that all works of legal academics are
344. Ironically, my argument could be taken as further justification for the most highly
theoretical and seemingly impractical works of today's legal academics. However, as I hope I
have made clear in the body of this article, while I believe that many, but not all, theoretical works
can have great value, I also believe that those who develop such theories have a responsibility to
infuse their work with practical value. If the academics who develop the meta theories do not
work to show their relevance to the real world, I doubt that anyone else will take on this difficult
endeavor.
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useless. In fact, practitioners who close their eyes to the value of theory
may be violating their ethical duty to represent their client zealously.
Practicing attorneys, judges, policymakers, and students also have
roles to play in encouraging academics to develop a jurisprudence of
practical applications, as discussed in this Article. Law schools and
legal academics often feel quite insulated from the pressures of the real
world, and so engage in whatever pursuits the professors find intellectu-
ally stimulating. Yet, if practitioners, judges, and policymakers were to
unite in demanding change in the focus of legal academia, some change
would surely occur. Practitioners, judges, and legislators ultimately
have tremendous influence over law schools, particularly as alumni,
funders, and arbiters over bar passage. Thus, practicing attorneys have
tremendous power to encourage if not dictate a change in law school
teaching and scholarship, to place greater emphasis on both the practical
value of legal theory and the jurisprudence of practical applications of
such theory.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article, I spoke of the battles that often seem to
rage in and around legal education: battles between scholarship and
teaching; between academics and practitioners; between abstract theory
and doctrine; and between theoretical and clinical teaching techniques. I
truly believe that in fighting these battles against one another we miss a
wonderful opportunity to join forces and work for a common good. As
the Llewellyn Report stated in 1945:
But if there be one school in a university of which it should be said
that there men learn to give practical reality, practical effectiveness,
to vision and to ideas, that school is the school of law. Our sugges-
tion is that, rightly approached, the road to sure vision proves to be at
the same time the road to true command of skill in practice: that
lesson from classic class-instruction is what needs relearning and
reapplication in the light of current conditions.345
Ironically, and sadly, it has now been fifty years since the Llewellyn
Report was published, and its message still sounds fresh and relevant.
We have not yet learned its lesson.
My call now is to end these battles. We need not choose between
theory and practice, nor between teaching and scholarship. Instead, let
us use our creative energies and common sense to make these bodies of
work mutually supportive. Perhaps if we begin to work together theore-
ticians and practitioners can truly come to respect one another's impor-
345. See LLEWE.LYN REPORT, supra note 77, at 391.
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tance. Let us use our theoretical insights to work for solutions to the
very practical problems in our classrooms and in our world. Let us work
together to achieve justice.
